University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
History ETDs

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

7-11-2013

"Is This Park to Memorialize Confederate Valor and
History or Not?": Sectionalist Civil War Memory in
the History of Manassas National Battlefield Park,
1861-2011
Michael Burns

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/hist_etds
Recommended Citation
Burns, Michael. ""Is This Park to Memorialize Confederate Valor and History or Not?": Sectionalist Civil War Memory in the History
of Manassas National Battlefield Park, 1861-2011." (2013). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/hist_etds/12

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in History ETDs by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact disc@unm.edu.

i

ii

© 2013, Michael Burns

iii

Acknowledgements
As with any project of this nature, although my name appears on the title page,
many others deserve credit for their input and assistance in this process. First and
foremost, I am indebted to my thesis committee, Dr. Paul Hutton, Dr. Durwood Ball, and
Dr. Jason Scott Smith. Dr. Hutton’s patience with my project and his input on both how I
sorted out what I found in the sources and my writing greatly strengthened this work. Dr.
Ball’s copyediting and suggestions significantly improved this project. Also, his
willingness to hire me as an assistant editor at the New Mexico Historical Review allowed
me to keep down my debt while finishing the master’s program. Dr. Smith’s
willingingness to jump in and read and comment on this project at the last minute help
finish the thesis on time. I am more than grateful for his help in these final steps. Also,
Dr. Sarah Cornell’s knowledge of works on Civil War memory and the direction this
research has gone improved this monograph. Although professional matters prevented
her from signing off on this thesis, I am indebted to her comments on this research. To all
four I cannot express fully how thankful I am for their help through these past three
years.
I also have to thank the two professors who introduced me to the wonderful world
of graduate study while I attended Grand Valley State University. Dr. Scott Stabler has
been a precious assest to my academic progress. Without his suggestion, I may have
never ended up attending UNM. In addition, he has given me numerous opportunities to
develop as an historian through my writing. Dr. Matthew Daley first introduced me to the
world of archival research and helped me publish my first article. Both these men deserve
immense credit for my progress in the study of history.

iv

Historian Joan Zenzen, the author of the Manassas administrative history that
inspired this topic, gracefully assisted in the early stages of finding primary sources.
Joseph Schwartz, archivist at the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, helped
me locate the Department of the Interior papers on which much of this research is based.
Jim Burgess, museum specialist at Manassas National Battlefield Park, amazes all
researchers with his encyclopedic knowledge of the battlefield’s library. His help freed
me from hours of pointless fumbling with the numerous papers hidden in those
collections. His assistance and his willingness to let me fire his historic weapons made
my summer of research at the park much less stressful.
My appreciation also goes out to my fellow graduate students at UNM and my
colleagues at Manassas National Battlefield. Their comradery both at school and while
working at the battlefield made these experiences at the least interesting and at the most
fun. Although there are too many people to name here, they all have my gratitude for the
times I’ve spent at UNM and Manassas.
Finally, but especially not least, I would like to thank my family. My brother and
sister-in-law made my time in Michigan easier as my confidants while at GVSU. Their
guidance while I was a naive undergraduate helped me through those important years.
My nephew has made the trips to visit the three of them immesurably more important and
enjoyable. Ultimately, without my parents I would not have followed my passion for
history. Their support for, and tolerance of—some might say—my obsession with the
Civil War allowed me to pursue it as a future profession. For all of this and their love, I
thank them the most.

v

Abstract
“Is This Park to Memorialize Confederate Valor and History or Not?”: Sectionalism and
Civil War Memory in the History of the Manassas Battlefields, 1861–2011
Michael Burns
B.S., History, Grand Valley State University, 2010
M.A., History, University of New Mexico, 2013
In the 150 years since the start of the U.S. Civil War, historians and laypeople
alike have debated the causes and conduct of the war. Through the acceptance of the
Confederate veterans’ memorial school the Lost Cause that led to reunification in the late
nineteenth century, the memory of the Civil War and the actual events became
indistinguishable. This blurring carried over into the work of interpretation at national
Civil War battlefield and military parks. Although numerous historians have tackled the
issues between Civil War memory and the national parks, and the connection to
reunification, the majority have examined only the five original Civil War sites—
Chickamauga-Chattanooga, Antietam, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Shiloh National Parks.
By examining the history of Manassas National Battlefield Park in Manassas, Virginia—
a National Park Service site created after the turn of the twentieth century and one that
preserves two Confederate victories—since the conclusion of the first battle, a more
complex story between memory and public interpretation arises. Instead of a story of
reconciliation between the North and South, one finds a narrative of sectional tensions
that remained even after the country reunified. Although the National Park Service has
attempted to fight against Lost Cause interpretation there since its establishment in 1940,
the legacy of its use of a shrine to Confederate history and memory shows that the
sectionalism of Civil War memory still exists in some facets of Civil War interpretation.
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Introduction
For four days in July 2011, with temperatures over one hundred degrees and
humidity to match, thousands of visitors, reenactors, and National Park Service (NPS)
rangers suffered through the Sesquicentennial weekend of the First Battle of Manassas.
At Manassas National Battlefield Park, a site only twenty-five miles from Washington,
D.C., the NPS provided visitors with interpretive talks and walking tours, as well as
special talks by respected historians, such as University of Richmond president Edward
Ayers and NPS chief historian emeritus Edwin Bearss. These, however, were not the only
weekend events. As has happened throughout the park’s history, a conflict took place
over how to commemorate the first major battle of the Civil War. Outside of the park
boundaries, thousands of reenactors and spectators took part in a reenactment of the first
battle. The spectacle included concessions and an opportunity to “witness” the battle first
hand as well as “experience” the lives of encamped Civil War soldiers.1
These two opposing forms of commemoration provide an opportunity to ask
important questions about how the Civil War has been and is remembered publicly at
National Park sites. Has the NPS fought against or embraced Lost Cause mythology? Do
the arguments and events from the past 150 years continue to influence Civil War
memory at Manassas? Finally, how have people and organizations outside the NPS and
the federal government contributed to how the Civil War is remembered at the park?
This thesis explores the construction and institution of Civil War memory at one
significant battlefield site, Manassas National Battlefield Park. Manassas provides an
interesting example for Civil War memory. Since the park preserves the sites of two

1

Heidi M. Baumstark, “2011’s Top Story: Remembering Manassas 150 years ago,” Bull Run
(Manassas, Va.) Observer, 30 December 2011.

1

battles (First Manassas in 1861 and Second Manassas in 1862), both of which were
Confederate victories, it differs from the majority of Civil War sites that mainly preserve
and interpret only one battle.2
An examination of the history of Manassas National Battlefield shows that the
park has been part of a continual struggle between Lost Cause memory and truthful
interpretation since the end of the war. By the turn of the twentieth century, the federal
government had preserved five battlefields from the Civil War—ChickamaugaChattanooga, Antietam, Gettysburg, Shiloh, and Vicksburg. These five sites were
established after Reconstruction in a time of sectional reconciliation throughout the
United States. Unlike these five parks, however, Manassas was not a part of
reconciliation. Instead, from the last shots fired at Manassas through the modern-day, a
sectionalist conflict has existed through the memory of these two battles, which
continually pitted the Lost Cause of the former Confederates against balanced
interpretation that would include the role of slavery in the conflict’s causes. Although the
Lost Cause had taken control of Civil War memory through the Second World War, the
Civil War Centennial from 1961 to 1965, combined with the strength of the Civil Rights
Movement, initiated changes that resulted in the Lost Cause mythology losing ground in
its influence over interpretation both in academia and in the public realm.3 The history of

2

Only three NPS Civil War sites preserve two or more battlefields. One is ChickamaugaChattanooga National Military Park in Northeastern Georgia/Southeastern Tennessee, which preserves the
battlefields of Chickamauga (Sept. 1863) and Chattanooga (Nov. 1863). The other is Fredericksburg and
Spotsylvania National Military Park in Central Virginia, which preserves four battlefields (Fredericksburg
[Dec. 1862], Chancellorsville [May 1863], the Wilderness [May 1864], and Spotsylvania [May 1864]). Out
of these three parks, Manassas National Battlefield is the only one dedicated to two clear-cut Confederate
victories.
3
Gary W. Gallagher, Lee and His Generals in History and Memory (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1998), esp. 264–283.

2

Manassas National Battlefield further reveals the complications that exist in Civil War
memory in the public realm since the end of the war.
Contested memory has been a scholarly subject for many historians.4 Although
personal memories influence collective memory, the memorials schools of historical
interpretation that emerged from the Civil War arose out of collective memory.
Historiography on Civil War memory centers mainly on the creation of the Lost Cause in
the war’s aftermath. Lost Cause mythology, on which U.S. historians generally based the
interpretation of the war through the 1960s, became central to the retelling of events. This
myth, developed by many prominent Confederate officials in the war’s aftermath of the
war, justified the astounding number of deaths and the vast destruction the former
Confederate states faced during the four years of war, while it defended Southern
secession and ignored slavery as the catalyst of the conflict. Although northerners and
southerners at the time of the war recognized slavery as the central issue of secession,
both sections eventually embraced this memory in the waning years of Reconstruction.
By the end of the nineteenth century, little public conflict existed between the two
sections as they reconciled their political differences before the turn of the century.5 The

4

Although numerous influential studies on collective memory in a broader context have been
published since the late 1980s, Civil War memory has dominated the historiography of collective memory
in the United States. For general studies of historical memory in the United States, see John Bodnar,
Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation
of Tradition in American Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); and Peter Novick, That Noble Dream:
The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1988).
5
For examples of nineteenth century Americans’ awareness of slavery’s role in the Civil War, see
Alexander H. Stephens, “Cornerstone Speech,” 21 March 1861, quoted in the National Park Service,
Slavery: Cause and Catalyst of the Civil War (Washington, D.C.: Eastern National Park and Monuments
Association, 2011), inside cover; and Pres. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, 4 March 1864,
quoted in David W. Blight, “The Civil War in American Memory,” The Civil War Remembered: Official
National Park Service Handbook, eds. Robert K. Sutton and John Latschar (Washington, D.C.: Eastern
National, 2011), 162. For the general studies on Lost Cause mythology and Civil War memory, see David
W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press

3

Lost Cause remains as the central focus when dealing with Civil War memory for, until
roughly 1960, it was the most common and influential narrative used to explain the
conflict.
Some historians have tackled how popular culture influences Civil War memory.
Through popular culture, especially film, these works find fluidity in the way people
remember the war. Throughout the early twentieth century, film and novels provided
people with a popular perception of what occurred during the conflict. These early works
mainly presented the Lost Cause. About midcentury, however, this emphasis started to
change as the Civil Rights Movement complicated what white Americans understood
about the war. In addition, the disastrous conflict in Vietnam turned many people away
from military history and its seeming glorification of combat. Memory through popular
culture shifted with the cultural changes that came about during the mid-twentieth
century. Yet, the Lost Cause never completely died in popular culture and still influences
how people perceive the conflict in some parts of the United States.6

of Harvard University Press, 2001); Rollin G. Osterweis, The Myth of the Lost Cause, 1865–1900
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1973); Carol Reardon, Pickett’s Charge in History and Memory (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Gary W. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan, eds., The Myth of
the Lost Cause and Civil War History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Gaines M. Foster,
Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865 to 1913
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Tony Horwitz, Confederates in the Attic: Dispatches from the
Unfinished Civil War (New York: Vintage Books, 1999); and Carol Reardon, “William T. Sherman in
Postwar Georgia’s Collective Memory, 1864–1914” in Wars within a War: Controversy and Conflict Over
the American Civil War, eds., Joan Waugh and Gary W. Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2009), 223-48.
6
Two of the most influential films in history, D. W. Griffith’s The Birth of a Nation (1915) and
David O. Selznick’s Gone with the Wind (1939), were based on two novels that glorified the Confederacy
and the Lost Cause, Thomas Dixon, Jr.’s The Clansmen (1905) and Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the
Wind (1936), respectively. Although some Civil War films opposed the Lost Cause theme, such as Andrew
V. McLaglen’s Shenandoah (1965) and Edward Zwick’s Glory (1989), the Lost Cause reemerged in the
1990s and 2000s with the release of Ronald Maxwell’s two films Gettysburg (1993) and Gods and
Generals (2003). For more on Civil War memory through popular culture, see Gary W. Gallagher, Causes
Won, Lost, and Forgotten: How Hollywood and Popular Art Shape What We Know About the Civil War
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Neil Longley York, Fiction as Fact: The Horse
Soldiers and Popular Memory (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2001); Will Kaufman, The Civil

4

The historiography of Civil War memory also includes a number of studies that
focus on the memory of individual battles and public commemoration. The majority of
these works, however, center almost solely on one of the first five preserved battlefields
or public actions to commemorate the dead. These monographs tend to emphasize the
conciliatory nature of memory that arose in the 1890s. By the final decade of the
nineteenth century, white northerners and white southerners had constructed a memory of
the war that ignored slavery’s role in the cause of the conflict. This construction
combined the Lost Cause memorial school with Reconciliation. Interpretation at these
parks as well as public commemorations tended to avoid conflict between North and
South by embracing this new memory that celebrated southern courage and championed
or reinforced reconciliation.7

War in American Culture (Edinburgh, Scot.: Edinburgh University Press, 2006); and Jim Cullen, The Civil
War in Popular Culture: A Reusable Past (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995).
7
For the Reconciliationist movement in preservation of the original battlefields, see Blight, Race
and Reunion, esp. 182, 189, 198–99; Timothy B. Smith, The Golden Age of Battlefield Preservation: The
Decade of the 1890s and the Establishment of America’s First Five Military Parks (Knoxville: The
University of Tennessee Press, 2008); Edward Tabor Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and Their
Battlefields (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), chap. 3; James A. Kaser, At the Bivouac of
Memory: History Politics and the Battle of Chickamauga, American University Studies, (New York: Peter
Lang Publishing, 1996); Jim Weeks, Gettysburg: Memory, Market, and an American Shrine (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); Timothy B. Smith, This Great Battlefield of Shiloh: History,
Memory, and the Establishment of a Civil War National Military Park (Knoxville: The University of
Tennessee Press, 2004); Christopher Waldrep, Vicksburg’s Long Shadow: The Civil War Legacy of Race
and Remembrance (New York: Rowland and Littlefield, 2005); and Susan Trail, “Remembering Antietam:
Commemoration and Preservation of a Civil War Battlefield,” (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2005).
For more general examinations of the motivations behind the establishment of the original national military
and battlefield parks, see Smith, The Golden Age of Battlefield Preservation; Ronald F. Lee, The Origin
and Evolution of the National Military Park Idea (Washington, D.C.: National Park Service, 1973); and
Carol Reardon, Soldiers and Scholars: The U.S. Army and the Uses of Military History, 1865–1920
(Lawrence: University Press of Kanasas, 1990), chap. 2.
For examinations of public commemoration, see Gallagher, Lee and His Generals in History and
Memory, 264–283; Robert J. Cook, Troubled Commemoration: The American Civil War Centennial, 1961–
1965 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007); Benjamin C. Cloyd, Haunted by Atrocity:
Civil War Prisons in American Memory (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010); Caroline
E. Jenney, Burying the Dead but not the Past: Ladies’ Memorial Associations and the Lost Cause (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); John R. Neff, Honoring the Civil War Dead:
Commemoration and the Problem of Reconciliation (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Thomas
J. Brown, The Public Art of Civil War Commemoration: A Brief History with Documents, The Bedford
Series in History and Culture (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2004); Jon Wiener, “Civil War, Cold War,

5

Little work has been published on how memory influenced the preservation and
interpretation of the two battles of Manassas. Some studies attack the NPS for its inability
to save and interpret sites that pertained to African American history both inside and
outside the park, and have little connection to the two battles.8 One administrative history
on Manassas focuses mainly on developments in the park’s land acquisitions and
administrative changes, rather than historical memory constructed or preserved there.
Other historians tend to explore Manassas in larger works that examines broader issues in
Civil War memory.9 Thus, an opening in the historiography remains to bring a fresh
perspective to Civil War memory at NPS sites. Battlefields established after the 1890s
can provide a new look at Civil War memory that complicates the common conciliatory
narrative found in previous studies on public interpretation and preservation by showing
that even after the Reconciliationist movement of the 1890s sectionalism remained strong
in the United States through the use of collective memory.
This project hopefully fills this void. Unlike previous works on Manassas’s
history, this thesis examines the connection between Civil War memory and the creation,

Civil Rights: The Civil War Centennial in Context, 1960–1965,” in The Memory of the Civil War in
American Culture, eds. Alice Fahs and Joan Waugh (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2004), 237–57; Dwight T. Pitcaithley, "'A Cosmic Threat': The National Park Service Addresses the Causes
of the American Civil War"; and Bruce Levine, “In Search of a Usable Past: Neo-Confederates and Black
Confederates” in Slavery and Public History: The Tough Stuff of American Memory, eds. James Oliver
Horton and Lois E. Horton (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 187–212. For an
example of a project that attempts to reverse the trend of Reconciliation in Civil War memory, see Barbara
A. Gannon, The Won Cause: Black and White Comradeship in the Grand Army of the Republic (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).
8
Erika K. Martin Seibert, "The Third Battle of Manassas: Power, Identity, and the Forgotten
African-American Past," in Myth, Memory, and the Making of the American Landscape, Paul Shackel, ed.,
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001); and Paul Shackel, Memory in Black and White: Race,
Commemoration, and the Post-Bellum Landscape, (Walnut Creek, Calif.: AltaMira Press, 2003).
9
For the park’s administrative history, see Joan M. Zenzen, Battling for Manassas: The Fifty-Year
Preservation Struggle at Manassas National Battlefield Park (University Park: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1998). For an example of an examination of Manassas within a larger work, see Gary W.
Gallagher, “Scapegoat in Victory: James Longstreet and the Battle of Second Manassas,” in Lee and His
Generals in History and Memory, 139–57.

6

development, and interpretation of Manassas National Battlefield Park from the end of
the war through modern times. Similar to two recent articles on memory at West Point in
the Gilded Age and at Chickamauga-Chattanooga National Military Park, an examination
of the creation and development of Manassas National Battlefield shows that
sectionalism continued to influence how the Civil War was remembered even after
reconciliation occurred.10 Unlike other examples of public memory, the conflict over
Manassas’s interpretation and memory persists today. Manassas’s complex history
mainly consists of continual conflict between hard-line Lost Cause enthusiasts looking to
protect the Confederacy in memory and a perceived Unionist leaning in the truthful
interpretation of the war that breaks down the Lost Cause mythology’s perceptions of the
Old South and the Confederacy. Developed as a memorial to the Lost Cause, Manassas
shows that conciliatory memory did not include all aspects of Civil War memory in the
years since Reconstruction.
Each chapter examines one of four main eras that dominated the issues of Civil
War memory at Manassas. Chapter one explores the creation of memory in the aftermath
of the Manassas battles. Starting in 1861, immediately after the First Battle of Manassas
ended, troops wrote about and debated the events that took place there. These veterans’
memories greatly influenced future interpretation. Chapter two examines the steps in the
creation of Manassas as a National Park site between 1910 and 1940. During this time,
the Confederate ancestral groups—the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) and the
United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC)—both pushed for and fought against the

10

James Tyrus Seidule, “‘Treason is Treason’: Civil War Memory at West Point, 1861–1902,”
The Journal of Military History, 76 (April 2012): 427–52; and Caroline E. Janney, “‘I Yield to No Man an
Iota of My Convictions’: Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park and the Limits of
Reconciliation,” The Journal of the Civil War Era, 2 (September 2012): 394–420.

7

federal government’s ownership of Manassas Battlefield. Unlike previously established
battlefield parks, Manassas was seen specifically as a Confederate memorial that needed
protection from Unionist influence. Chapter three explores the thirty years (1940–1970)
surrounding the Centennial celebration of the Civil War at Manassas. These years
became a turning point for the park’s history and for Civil War memory as the Lost
Cause lost a great deal of influence over interpretation. Finally, chapter four inspects
changes in the park since 1970 and what the NPS has done to address issues or problems
connected to Lost Cause interpretation. As the NPS has battled against the Lost Cause,
outside influences, such as threats of constructing theme parks on or near the park, also
created controversy around Manassas. Although Confederate veterans and, later, the SCV
and UDC pushed for Manassas’s preservation as a Lost Cause memorial, interpretation
and preservation at the park has been a continual battleground over Civil War memory.

8

Chapter 1
Creating a Justifiable Memory: Veterans’ Remembrances after the Battles, 1861–
1910
“It is now generally admitted that it was one of the best-planned battles of the war, but
one of the worst-fought.”
- Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman on First Manassas, 18911
The First Battle of Manassas, fought on 21 July 1861, has long overshadowed the
larger, bloodier fight of 28, 29, and 30 August 1862. Each battle, however, possesses its
own significance in the larger context of the American Civil War. To understand how the
First and Second Battles of Manassas are remembered, it is vital to know the events of
the battles themselves and how memory influenced creating accurate interpretations of
them. The First Battle of Manassas was the initial major land battle of the conflict and
indicated things to come, for more casualties fell during this fight than in any prior
American battle.2 On the other hand, the second battle holds an important place in a
string of events that showed a major shift in the momentum of the war and related
directly to both the Battle of Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation.3 Knowing the
events according to the officers’ reports and objective secondary sources is important to
1

William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman, 2 vols. (1891; repr., Scituate,
Mass.: Digital Scanning, 1999), 1:209. Sherman was a Colonel commanding a Union brigade at First Bull
Run. In the American Civil War, the Union and Confederates generally gave different names to the same
battle. Thus, we have the Battle of Bull Run or Manassas. For the purpose of this thesis, I will be using the
name Manassas mainly because the battlefield park is named after the Confederate designation.
2
For the most complete studies on the First Manassas campaign, see William C. Davis, Battle at
Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Company, Inc., 1977); John J. Hennessy, The First Battle of Manassas: An End to Innocence, July 18-21,
1861 (Lynchburg, Va.: H. E. Howard, 1989); and Ethan S. Rafuse, A Single Grand Victory: The First
Campaign and Battle of Manassas (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2002).
3
The only truly authoritative work on the Second Manassas campaign and the battle is John J.
Hennessey, Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas (1993; repr., Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1999). An older study of the opening fighting, Alan D. Gaff, Brave Men’s
Tears: The Iron Brigade at Brawner Farm (Dayton, Ohio: Morningside Press, 1985) and a new study of the
battle’s culmination, Scott C. Patchan, Second Manassas: Longstreet’s Attack and the Struggle for Chinn
Ridge (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2011), examine single aspects of the battle, but overlook the larger
context of the enitre campaign. In addition, although James M. McPherson’s Crossroads of Freedom:
Antietam, Pivotal Moments in American History series (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), mainly
focuses on the political, martial, and social ramifications of the approach to and aftermath of the Battle of
Antietam, he successfully places Second Manassas within the larger context of the Civil War in 1862.

9

understanding memory’s influence over the conflicting interpretations of the battles.
Memory of both battles often diverges from the actual course of the fighting.
First Manassas or Bull Run
After Abraham Lincoln’s election to the presidency in November 1860, seven
southern states seceeded from the United States. By April 1861, sectional tensions
intensified, and the South Carolina militia bombarded the Union’s Fort Sumter starting
on 12 April 1861. The following day, the Union garrison surrendered to the Confederates,
leading to preparations for all-out war by both sides. Lincoln made a call for seventy-five
thousand volunteers. The Confederates surpassed that number with a summons of one
hundred thousand volunteers only days later. Four additional states quickly joined the
Confederacy.4
Both sides assembled their untrained, inexperienced volunteer soldiers in
preparation for combat. The Union Army of Northeast Virginia, the main Union force
gathering in Washington, consisted of approximately thirty-five thousand soldiers while
the Confederate Army of the Potomac, the Confederate force stationed in northern
Virginia, had about twenty thousand troops. These two armies were the two largest forces
gathered in U.S. history to that time. Neither side possessed an officer with the
experience of commanding such large armies. Lt. Gen. Winfield Scott, the commander of
U.S. forces in Central Mexico only fifteen years prior and the most experienced officer of
either government, was the general in chief for the United States at this time, but his
career as a battlefield leader had long ago come to an end. Instead, the Lincoln
administration promoted an inexperienced major, named Irvin McDowell, to brigadier
4

Jacob D. Cox, “War Preparations in the North,” in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War
(hereafter Battles and Leaders), eds. Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, 4 vols. (1884–
1887; repr., New York: Castle Books, 1991), 1:86.

10

general to command the Union force in Virginia. For the Confederate government, the
problem of finding an overall commander for the Army of the Potomac was just as
difficult. The Rebels appointed the commander of the South Carolinians who had
bombarded Fort Sumter, Brig. Gen. Pierre Gustav Toutounte Beauregard, to head this
force.5
In addition, neither side expected this conflict to last long. Both belligerents
believed they could swiftly defeat their enemy and conquer the opposition’s capital in
less than three months, with enlistments for both sides reflecting this sentiment. The lack
of experienced soldiers in both armies meant that the majority of the troops did not
understand the brutal reality of combat. They believed the fighting would be a romantic,
even chivalric, adventure, but the battle on 21 July would quickly teach them otherwise.6
McDowell, knowing his men were untested, desired to train the Army of
Northeast Virginia as much as possible prior to moving into Virginia to fight
Beauregard’s force. Yet political pressures placed on and exerted by the Lincoln
administration, as well as calls of “On to Richmond” from the northern people, forced
McDowell into launching his command earlier than he wanted. The campaign officially
began on 16 July 1861, when the Army of Northeast Virginia moved toward the
Confederate positions along the banks of Bull Run. With the approach of McDowell’s
force of thirty-five thousand men, Beauregard realized that he needed reinforcements to
hold the area. He sent a message to Brigadier General Joseph E. Johnston and his
Confederate force in the Shenandoah Valley to transport his troops to Northern Virginia.
The additional ten thousand soldiers under Johnston’s command raised the total force of

5
6

Davis, Battle at Bull Run, 1–5, 9–11, 49–53; Hennessy, The First Battle of Manassas, 3–6.
Hennessy, The First Battle of Manassas, 128–29.
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Confederates near Manassas to approximatley thirty thousand men, almost equal in size
to McDowell’s army.7
By 18 July, the two forces came into contact at an area known as Blackburn’s
Ford. This minor fight resulted in the Union force’s defeat and showed McDowell that
Beauregard’s force held a stronger position than he had initially believed and compelled a
change of strategy for this campaign. McDowell decided after the battle at Blackburn’s
Ford that to defeat the Confederates, he would need to outflank their position.8
On 21 July, he ordered his troops to rise at two-thirty a.m. and march toward the
Confederate position’s extreme left. When they approached the creek at the point where
the Warrenton Turnpike crossed over a stone bridge, about eighteen thousand soldiers
turned north in order to cross Bull Run farther upstream and come in behind the
Confederate soldiers positioned near the bridge, while three brigades held the
Confederates in place throughout the morning.9 Initally believing the march would be
two miles in length, the Union officers were surprised to discover the route was twelve
miles. The flanking maneuvre delayed McDowell’s plans for a dawn assault. In addition,
while these Union troops marched to the north, the Confederate signal commander,
Captain Edward Porter Alexander, spotted the movement and warned Colonel Nathan
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“Shanks” Evans, commander of the Confederate brigade defending the Confederate’s
left, “Look out to your left, you are turned.”10
With this early warning from Alexander, Evans decided to buy time for the arrival
of Confederate reinforcements in his area. With only nine hundred men, Evans took up a
position along the slope of a ridge known as Matthew’s Hill directly in front of the Union
route of attack. By ten a.m., the first Union troops, the Second Rhode Island Infantry,
arrived at the top of the hill and were immediately hit by Confederate musketry.
Brigadier General David Hunter, the Union division commander, initially sent forward
only the approximately nine hundred men in the Second Rhode Island to fight Evans’s
equal number of troops, despite having almost forty-five hundred men already across
Bull Run. Evans’s men were able to hold off the Rhode Islanders, but after about fifteen
minutes of fighting Hunter received a wound to his neck and relinquished command to
his subordinate, General Andrew Porter.11
Once Porter took charge, he pushed forward the remainder of Hunter’s division,
as Union troops continued to cross Bull Run. After thirty minutes, Evans’s brigade,
overwhelmed by Union numbers and taking heavy casualties, began retreating from
Matthew’s Hill. While Evans attempted to keep his command along the slopes of the
ridge, he looked south and spotted Confederate reinforcements who had arrived less than
a mile from his position. Evans immediately requested that Brigadier General Barnard
10
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Bee and Colonel Francis Bartow push their men forward to reinforce Evans’s line. Bee
hesitated, believing he held a stronger position, but followed through on Evans’s request.
For the next hour, additional Union troops charged into the fight as Bee, Bartow,
and Evans continued to hold their line. The Fourth Alabama Infantry Regiment’s chaplin,
James G. Hudson, described the scene: “It was a critical moment, and a fearful position
for a handful of men . . . to occupy with nothing to shelter them from the fearful storm of
bullets.” Although the regiment held such a precarious position, Hudson noted that “the
boys stood it with a courage and coolness that would have done credit to a set of old and
experienced veterans.”12 Heavy casualties, the prescence of Union artillery on their left
flank, and the advance by Colonel William Techumseh Sherman’s brigade against the
Confederate’s right rear, however, forced them to relinquish the field. Having never
before seen combat, many soldiers on both sides were now stunned by the horror of
battle. For the majority of the Confederate soldiers, the retreat turned into a panic.
Believing he had victory within his grasp, McDowell rode forward with his men, waving
his hat in the air and shouting, “Victory! Victory! The day is ours.”13
Despite the success of the Union force, McDowell knew his men were completely
exhausted by the twelve mile march they had just undertaken and decided to bring the
advance to a halt to allow the men to rest. McDowell, however, would delay further
movements for almost two hours. While McDowell’s troops rested along Matthew’s Hill,
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additional Confederate soldiers arrived on the plateau known as Henry Hill near Bee’s
original position.14
The first troops to take up the new Confederate position were the five Virginia
regiments of the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah’s first brigade under the command
of Brigadier General Thomas Jonathan Jackson. Bee, who now retreated with the
remnants of his brigade from Matthew’s Hill, approached Jackson and exclaimed,
“General, they are driving us!” Jackson cooly responded, “Sir, we will give them the
bayonet.” After this brief conversation, Bee, now rejuvinated and ready for a fight, rode
off into the woods behind the new Confederate line to find his command.15
After his two hour lull, McDowell finally pushed his men towards the top of
Henry Hill. Initially, he sent two artillery batteries to confront the Confederates. The two
artillery commanders, Captain James B. Ricketts and Captain Charles Griffin, objected to
placing their rifled ordnance only about four hundred yards from the enemy’s line where
their guns would be ineffective, but McDowell ignored their concerns and ordered them
to the top of the hill. Ricketts’s and Griffin’s eleven guns took up positions flanking the
small farmhouse owned by eighty-five-year-old Judith Henry and opened fire on the
Confederates.16 Shortly after, Ricketts’s men started taking musketry fire from
Confederate sharpshooters positioned around the Henry house. To eliminate this threat,
Ricketts ordered the two guns nearest the house to fire a round each into the structure,
14
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which “literally riddled it.” The fire pushed the Confederates away, but some of the
debries from the cannon fire struck Mrs. Henry, who was still inside the house, mortally
wounding her.17
After firing on the Henry house, Ricketts returned his attention to the Confederate
infantry and artillery that had been forming in the tree line across the top of the hill. For
the next forty-five minutes, the Union and Confederate artillery dueled across the
approximately four hundred yards that seperated them while Union troops started to take
position behind Ricketts’s and Griffin’s batteries. The line held by the Union men,
however, placed its right flank directly in front of Jackson’s Confederate troops hidden in
the tree line. The Confederates opened fire with devastating results forcing the Union
soldiers off the hill. Ricketts described the sudden intensity of the fight on Henry Hill: “It
was the hottest place I ever saw in my life, and I had seen some fighting before.”18
This successful volley by the Confederates started to reverse the momentum of
the battle. The smoothbore Confederate guns were successfully outgunning Ricketts’s
and Griffin’s rifled batteries. In order to try gaining an advantage against the
Confederates, Griffin made a bold decision to move two of his guns to a position along
the left end of the Confederate artillery line. Once he placed his pieces, Griffin reported
that he saw a line of blue clad soldiers emerge from the trees and march towards his
position. This created a problem for Griffin because, since over two hundred different
uniforms were used by the two sides and the flags were indistinguishable, he could not
tell whether these troops were Union or Confederate infantry units. He soon discovered
17
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these men were part of Jackson’s brigade when they stopped fifty yards from Griffin’s
guns and fired on his men. As Griffin remembered, “That was the last of us.” After all of
Griffin’s soldiers fell dead or wounded, the Thirty-third Virginia Infantry Regiment
charged the pieces and captured the two guns.19
In response, the Fourteenth Brooklyn Infantry pushed forward, forcing the Thirtythird Virginia back into the trees. The Confederates, however, aggressively
counterattacked the Union position. While Jackson’s men engaged the enemy, Bee, who
had been riding around in the woods for approximately an hour searching for anyone
under his command, stumbled onto the men of the Fourth Alabama Infantry, one of the
regiments in his brigade. They had reformed in a clearing behind the Confederate lines
and were awaiting orders. After realizing who these men were, Bee reoriented himself to
the battle and pointed toward where he had met Jackson while ordering his men back into
battle. What Bee actually exclaimed is not known for sure, but most likely he shouted,
“Yonder stands Jackson like a stonewall! Let us go to his assistance!” Bee then led his
men into the fight and received a mortal wound, dying on the night of 21 July. After this
battle, Bee’s statement gave Thomas Jonathan Jackson his immortal sobriquet,
“Stonewall” and his brigade became known as the “Stonewall” Brigade.20
For the next hour, regiments from both armies charged back and forth across the
top of Henry Hill, mainly swirling around Ricketts’s six cannon. Following the bitter,
see-saw fighting, Jackson’s five regiments reformed in the trees and charged back across
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the field, finally capturing Ricketts’s battery and establishing a defensive line along the
hill’s western slope. Additional Confederate regiments that had been part of the fighting
on Henry Hill also joined Jackson’s position. McDowell’s force, desperate to win the
fight, made multiple piecemeal assaults against the Confederate position, sending only
one or two regiments at a time, but the rebels were able to hold off each attack.21
With the position on Henry Hill secured, Confederate commanders Beauregard
and Johnston sent reinforcements from the line along Bull Run, as well as the troops who
arrived at Manassas Junction from the Shenandoah Valley that afternoon, to extend their
line’s left flank for a mile onto high ground known as Chinn Ridge. The only Union
outfit on this ridge, however, was a single brigade of New England troops under the
command of Colonel Oliver O. Howard. The additional Confederates on the Union
brigade’s right quickly forced the vulnerable New Englanders off the high ground. The
retreat of Howard’s men started a chain reaction in the Union army. As Confederates
came in from the rear of the Union line facing Henry Hill, McDowell’s force melted
away from the field.22
The Union force at first had a fairly organized retreat from the field. A lucky
salvo by one of the Confederate batteries, however, struck an army wagon on a bridge
over Cub Run about three miles east of Bull Run, creating panic in the Union troops, and
the civilians who had arrived from Washington to witness the battle. With this uproar, the
Union soldiers and civilians streamed pell mell back to their capital’s defenses to prepare
for a Confederate pursuit that never materialized. By the end of the fighting on 21 July,
21
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the nation finally saw the harsh toll of combat. Approximately five thousand soldiers
from both armies were counted as casualties of the battle. Out of these losses, almost nine
hundred men died on the fields of Manassas. This was the highest number of Americans
killed in a single battle in the nation’s history to that point.23
The bloodshed at Bull Run produced a number of changes both in the soldiers’
attitudes towards combat and in military organization. Shortly after the disastrous Union
defeat, the Lincoln administration replaced McDowell with another upstart General
George B. McClellan. He reorganized the Union force into the Army of the Potomac. The
Confederates followed suit. Beauregard’s successful stand along Bull Run led to
Confederate president Jefferson Davis’s decision to send him west to assist with
commanding the western force, which was defeated at the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862.
The elder Johnston became the commander of the Confederate Army of the Potomac and
prepared for another Union invasion of Virginia after the battle.24
The inexperience that marked First Manassas, however, would not affect the two
armies that returned to the area only thirteen months after the first major battle of the war.
The replacement of McDowell and Beauregard with, respectively, McClellan and
Johnston allowed for further training of the troops and a higher quality of leadership in
the two command structures. Despite high hopes for the new commanders, their
promotions to high command produced few positive results. Johnston was wounded and
disabled in May 1862. McClellan’s massive ego and overly cautious nature led not to a
Union victory but to his replacement in late 1862.
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Second Manassas or Bull Run
Ten months after the fighting along Bull Run, the Lincoln administration had
expected a Union victory with the capture of the Confederate capital of Richmond. By
late May 1862, McClellan’s one hundred thousand man Army of the Potomac had made
its way up the peninsula between the York and James Rivers and sat only five miles from
Richmond. In a twist of fate for the Confederates, during an attempt at pushing
McClellan away from Richmond in the Battle of Seven Pines (31 May–1 June 1862),
Johnston received a grevious wound and relinquished command to General Robert E.
Lee, who reorganized the Confederate force into the Army of Northern Viriginia. Lee, an
extremely aggressive commander, then attacked the Union forces six times in seven days
(the Seven Days Battles, 25 June–1 July) and pushed the Army of the Potomac twenty
miles away from Richmond to the banks of the James River. Through this successful
series of assaults, however, Lee’s army became lodged between two Union forces.25
During McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign, the Lincoln administration created a
new force known as the Army of Virginia—a combination of three former Union armies
defeated by Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley in spring 1862—under the
command of Major General John Pope.26 Pope’s staunch support for the Republican
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Party, his successes along the Mississippi River in early 1862, and his personal
connections to the Lincolns (Pope was related to Mary Todd through marriage) made him
a perfect candidate for this new appointment. With McClellan’s flight to the James,
however, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton ordered Pope to remain in his position
along the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers, north of Richmond, so that his force could
protect Washington from a Confederate advance.27
The presence of the fifty thousand-man Army of Virginia complicated Lee’s
strategy. Thus, Lee made the decision to divide his army, a tactic he employed numerous
times throughout the war, sending about twenty-five thousand men under Jackson to
confront Pope while holding Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s thirty thousand man
wing in front of McClellan. Lee’s situation was made simpler by the Lincoln
administration’s decision to order McClellan to abandon the peninsula and join Pope’s
force on 4 August. Without the specter of McClellan’s army hovering near Richmond,
Lee was now free to unite Longstreet’s wing with Jackson’s men and confront the Army
of Virginia alone.28
After only three weeks of manuevring between Richmond and the Rappahannock
River, Lee’s campaign came to a standstill along the Rappahannock’s banks. Only a
single battle between Major General Nathaniel P. Banks’s Second Corps of the Army of
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Viriginia and Jackson’s wing, the Battle of Cedar Mountain, had taken place since the
Seven Days Battles.29 Since that fight on 9 August, Lee had arrived to look for an
opportunity to defeat Pope, but the strength of the Union position along the river
discouraged him from a direct assault. With his army stalled, Lee understood his force
was in trouble since the more time spent along the Rappanhannock, the easier it would be
for the Army of the Potomac to reinforce Pope.30
In order to get his campaign restarted, Lee devised a plan to strike at Pope’s
supply and communication lines and have the Army of Northern Virginia get between
Pope and Washington. According to Lee’s plan, the army would once again split.
Jackson, with about twenty-four thousand men, would feint toward the Shenandoah
Valley and then move north and east, around Pope’s right flank to strike at Pope’s supply
depot at Manassas Junction. Longstreet’s wing would remain along the Rapidan River to
prevent Pope from attacking Jackson until after he reached Manassas. By destroying
Manassas Junction, Jackson would draw Pope back into Northern Virginia.31
On 25 August, Jackson started his men on their march around Pope’s flank. In
thirty hours, Jackson’s men marched fifty-four miles and arrived just south of the
junction, where they skirmished with a number of Union regiments. Not until 27 August
did Pope realize that Jackson had not marched to the Shenandoah Valley as he expected
but had cut his supply line at Manassas Junction. Pope immediately ordered his troops
29
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back to Manassas to reestablish his communications with Washington and to trap
Jackson. By time Pope arrived at the junction on 28 August, Jackson seemed to have
disappeared. Pope’s only intelligence came from Confederate stragglers who told him
that Jackson had moved to the nearby town of Centreville, only five miles east of the
field of the first battle. After receiving these reports, Pope revised his orders and told his
officers to march their units to Centreville.32
Jackson, however, had not gone to Centreville as these stragglers claimed. In fact,
he moved his wing to a position slightly northwest of the former battlefield, along high
ground known as Stony Ridge. The ridge played perfectly into Jackson’s plan because he
held a position near an unfinished railroad bed, which his men could use as a ready-made
trench while holding off Pope’s army and awaiting the arrival of Longstreet’s wing.
Unaware of Jackson’s actual position, Pope directed a number of his divisions along the
Warrenton Turnpike directly in front of Jackson’s wing.
Late in the afternoon of 28 August 1862, Jackson spotted an isolated six thousand
man Union division under the command of Brigadier General Rufus King, who had been
incapacitated by an epileptic seizure on 23 August, near the Brawner Farmhouse. King’s
seizure created problems for his division since none of his brigade commanders knew
who was his direct subordinate. In addition, these four brigades, commanded by
Brigadier Generals John Gibbon, Abner Doubleday, John Hatch, and Marsena Patrick,
consisted of mostly inexperienced regiments.33
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The confusion in this Union division created a grand opportunity for Jackson to
destroy a chunk of Pope’s army. Jackson decided to bring King’s division into battle and
launched his men forward. At first, Jackson ordered four of his artillery pieces to fire on
King’s division along the Warrenton Turnpike. After taking fire from Jackson’s guns, the
Union soldiers of Gibbon’s (also known as the Black Hat Brigade) and Doubleday’s
brigades took cover in the woods near the road, but the confusion in command meant that
only these two brigades would fight Jackson’s Confederates.
Initially believing they only faced four artillery pieces, Gibbon and Doubleday
decided to send a single regiment, the Second Wisconsin Infantry of the Black Hat
Brigade, the only veteran regiment in these two brigades, forward against the Confederate
guns. Once the Second Wisconsin emerged from the tree line, however, it saw the
Confederate cannons fall back from the top of the ridge followed by the arrival of
Jackson’s “Stonewall” Brigade. These veteran Confederates halted only fifty yards from
the Second Wisconsin’s position and sent a volley of musketry into the Wisconsin troops.
Once the infantry fire opened, Gibbon and Doubleday, as well as Jackson, pushed
additional men into the fray. Although outnumbering the Union soldiers four to one,
Jackson was unable to bring all twenty-four thousand men under his command into the
fight despite the short two-mile distance between the Brawner Farm area and Jackson’s
left flank. In addition, both of Jackson’s division commanders, Major General Richard S.
Ewell and Brigadier General William B. Taliaferro, were wounded during the fighting,
making management of the battle difficult for him.34
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For two hours, the lines of Union and Confederate troops, which were no farther
than eighty yards apart, fired volley after volley at each other. Gibbon described the
fighting as a “regular stand up fight during which neither side yielded a foot.” The four
inexperienced regiments of the Black Hat Brigade, the Second, Sixth, and Seventh
Wisconsin and the Nineteenth Indiana, and a company each from the Fifty-Sixth
Pennsylvania and the Seventy-Sixth New York (Doubleday’s Brigade) were able to hold
their ground against the overwhelming force of veteran Confederates. Gibbon praised his
men as exhibiting “the highest degree the effects of discipline and drill, officers and men
standing up to their work like old soldiers.” Additional Confederate soldiers, however,
moved against the left flank of the Union line near the Brawner house, forcing the Union
soldiers back toward the trees in which they had initially taken cover during the artillery
fire. Darkness ended the fighting that night, with approximately twenty-two hundred
combined casualties left on the field.35
Once the fighting came to an end and Pope heard from King’s brigade
commanders about the pitched battle, he attempted to send a new order instructing the
four brigades of King’s division remain in place. The courier, however, got lost in the
darkness and failed to deliver the new orders. King had partially recovered from his
seizure, but his brigade commanders were now left to make the decision themselves.
Once they heard from Confederate captives that Jackson had fifty thousand to sixty
thousand men in the area, King and his subordinates decided to follow their initial orders
and continue to Centreville. They did not know that the position they held was
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advantageous for Pope’s command. King’s division, after the fighting at Brawner Farm,
sat along the right flank of Jackson’s line and directly in the path of Longstreet’s wing.
The rebels had broken through a stiff Union rear-guard action at Thoroughfare Gap at the
same time as the fighting at the Brawner Farm on 28 August.36
The fighting at Brawner Farm indicated to Pope where Jackson had positioned his
force after he attacked Manassas Junction. The following morning, Pope pushed his men
from Centreville to the old battleground of First Bull Run. At first, only his First Corps
under Major General Franz Sigel was on the field on the morning of 29 August. Pope had
ordered Sigel to scout Jackson’s position to find a weak point for the Army of Virginia to
assault. But confusion reigned in Sigel’s movements. For example, one of his brigades
that was ordered to march north to rejoin the rest of the corps actually moved west toward
Jackson’s position with disastrous results. Throughout the morning, Sigel sent forward a
number of piecemeal attacks, with only a single successful assault near an area in the
unfinished railroad known as the dump. This breakthrough convinced the Union
commands that they could gain an easy victory with a number of vigorous assaults
against Jackson’s position.37
By noon, however, it became apparent to Pope that these frontal assaults could
not work by themselves. He decided to use a corps sent from the Army of the Potomac,
the Fifth Corps under Major General Fitz-John Porter, to attack Jackson’s right flank as
he sent a number of diversionary assaults against Jackson’s front. Yet, the Union officers
were unaware that Longstreet’s thirty thousand troops had arrived on the field and had
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taken up a position along Jackson’s left. This prevented Porter from carrying out his
orders, which would have major ramifications and result in Porter’s court martial one
year later. Despite Porter’s apparent apathy, Pope continued the “diversionary” frontal
assaults, which resulted in two successful, but ultimately fruitless, breakthroughs in
Jackson’s line. The consequence of the fighting on 29 August convinced Pope that he
was on the verge of victory.38
The following morning, Pope and his officers scanned the Confederate line to find
a weak point in Jackson’s position. While scouting Jackson’s line, the Union officers saw
Confederates apparently retreating. What they actually witnessed, however, was the
Confederate division under General Richard H. Anderson, which had arrived on the field
late on 29 August and marched past the Confederate line. Anderson’s division was
attempting to return to its comrade’s position. Despite hearing reports of Longstreet’s
arrival, Pope and his officers believed that this Confederate “retreat” showed a
weakening of the Confederate line near an area known as the Deep Cut. With this
intelligence, Pope ordered Porter’s corps, the men whom he believed were the freshest
ones on the field, to prepare for the assault.39
Following Pope’s initiative, Porter ordered his corps to an area a mile to the front
of Jackson’s position to prepare for the attack. Despite having eleven thousand men under
his command, Porter made the assault with only six thousand due to his vague orders,
which caused five thousand of his men to get lost. Even with his force depleted, Porter’s
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men went forward in the largest Union assault of the battle. Covering three to six hundred
yards of open ground, the majority of the six thousand men made their way to the front of
the railroad embankment, but became trapped there due to Confederate infantry fire from
their front and Confederate artillery fire from their left. Eventually, a number of the
Confederate troops in the Deep Cut climbed to the top of the embankment and fired at the
Union troops lying along its front. One of the Louisiana regiments ultimately ran out of
ammunition and started throwing rocks at the Union soldiers. This event would become a
part of Confederate lore, but the Louisianans were in this situation for only a few
minutes, as they received reinforcements from other sections of Jackson’s line. After
thirty minutes, Union officers realized the fruitlessness of trying to continue the assault
and ordered a retreat.40
Out of the six thousand men who went forward, Porter’s corps lost two thousand,
a number that caused panic in the surviving soldiers. Witnessing the disaster from the
area known as Dogan Ridge, Pope erroneously believed, since the two corps on Dogan
Ridge shored up the lines and prevented Porter’s men from continuing past, that he had to
place reinforcements in position to rally Porter’s men and to prevent a rout. The only
additional troops he had available, due to McClellan’s refusal to send forward additional
men from the Army of the Potomac, were those along his left flank, directly in front of
Longstreet’s thirty thousand men. Thus, Pope ordered the majority of his troops from his
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left flank to a position near his right leaving only 2,200 men in position facing
Longstreet’s wing.41
With the failure of Porter’s assault and the movement of Union troops to reinforce
their right, Lee and Longstreet decided this was their opportunity to counterattack.
Shortly after Jackson’s men held off Porter’s troops, Longstreet ordered his officers to
prepare for the counterstrike. The result was the largest assault of the entire war.
Almost all thirty thousand men in Longstreet’s wing prepared to attack the Union
left flank. Lee ordered Jackson to watch Longstreet’s left to prevent flanking fire against
Longstreet’s wing. Shortly before 4 p.m., Longstreet’s troops launched their assault with
the objective of capturing Henry Hill and cutting off the Union retreat route. Initially,
they struck the skirmishers of the Tenth New York Infantry. Unable to slow the
Confederate advance, the skirmishers fell back toward the rest of the Tenth and the Fifth
New York. As these skirmishers bounded out of the woods surrounding their position, the
Fifth and Tenth New York attempted to position themselves for a stand against the
Confederate onslaught. The Confederates, however, moved to just inside the tree line and
opened fire on the two regiments. For the next five minutes the Fifth and Tenth New
York held their ground until the two regiments disintegrated and fled to Henry Hill. The
result was devastating. For example, the Fifth New York lost 330 men out of 560 as
casualties. Out of those 330 men, 123 were killed or mortally wounded, the highest
number of men killed in a single regiment in any single battle of the Civil War.42
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After witnessing this fiasco, corps commander Irvin McDowell, the former
commander of the Army of Northeast Virginia, sent a brigade and two artillery pieces to
slow the momentum of Longstreet’s assault. Longstreet’s men, however, quickly overran
this new Union position, destroying two more regiments and capturing the two guns. The
only troops who stood in Longstreet’s path were the Seventy-fifth, Seventy-third,
Twenty-fifth, and Fifty-fifth Ohio Infantry positioned on Chinn Ridge. These twelve
hundred Ohioans had just witnessed all the devastation in front of them and prepared to
take the brunt of Longstreet’s attack. Once the Confederates arrived only yards from their
line, the Ohioans opened fire and forced the Confederates to fall back and regroup.43
By this point, Lee had sent a second order to Jackson telling him to push forward
against the Union artillery on Dogan Ridge just north of Chinn Ridge. Jackson, however,
failed to maneuver his men and the Union batteries opened fire on the left flank of
Longstreet’s wing. This forced the Confederates, who had come to a halt after their
success, to take cover in a small grove of trees to the front left of the Ohioans line.
Although the Union artillery tried to help the Ohioans, the movement of the Confederates
to the trees created problems for these troops. Once the Confederates regrouped, they
attempted to strike the Ohioans’ left flank, but the Seventy-third and Twenty-fifth Ohio
held off the initial assaults. After fending off the first attack, the Ohioans spotted a larger
unit of Confederate troops farther to their left. This division had lost its way, but upon
hearing the musketry, it turned north toward the Union position. By adjusting their line,
the Seventy-third and Twenty-fifth Ohio attempted once again to push back this new
threat. After fifteen minutes, however, the presence of these fresh Confederate troops
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forced the two regiments back toward the Seventy-fifth and Fifty-fifth Ohio, who joined
the two battered regiments and set up a new defensive line against the Confederates,
forcing them back to regroup once again.44
Fresh Confederate troops joined in the attack, striking both flanks of the Ohioans.
Only fifteen minutes later, the Ohioans, who had taken over four hundred casualties in
the first thirty minutes, started to melt away from the top of the ridge. McDowell had
finally convinced Pope of the disaster in progress and had taken control of stemming the
tide of Longstreet’s assault along Chinn Ridge. Thus, he started sending reinforcements
from the right of the Union position to the top of the ridge. But he was only able to send a
single brigade at a time. Yet, each time a fresh brigade arrived, the Confederates were
forced to regroup before breaking through the new position. For the next hour, the
remnants of the Ohio regiments and each fresh brigade held Longstreet’s men along the
top of the ridge, only giving a few yards of ground at a time.45
This was the opportunity that Pope needed to save his army from complete
destruction. Once Pope saw the new threat, he repositioned his force along the high
ground of Matthew’s Hill and Henry Hill to keep his retreat route open. After the hourand-a-half of fighting along Chinn Ridge the Union troops finally fell back to the new
position. The Chinn Ridge stand prevented Longstreet’s men from completely destroying
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the Union line and bloodied Longstreet’s wing enough to prevent a direct pursuit of the
retreating Union soldiers.46
The stall of Longstreet’s assault created problems for the Confederates. By the
end of the fighting on Chinn Ridge, it was nearing 6 p.m. and the sun was setting.
Knowing darkness would bring a close to the battle, Longstreet pushed his men forward
as quickly as possible. In addition, Jackson’s wing finally charged out of the unfinished
railroad cut to assault the new Union line. But the new position allowed Pope’s force to
bring the Confederate onslaught to a close as darkness fell over the fields. Union cavalry
kept their retreat route open by stopping one final, desperate Confederate cavalry charge
towards the Union rear. His army badly beaten and now exhausted, Pope ordered a
general retreat the night of 30 August, bringing the Second Battle of Manassas to a close
as a Confederate victory.47
The following day, Lee sent Jackson on a pursuit of the Army of Virginia while
he prepared Longstreet’s wing to follow. The Second Battle of Manassas resulted in
23,000 casualties, a much larger number than those in the initial fight only thirteen
months prior. Although Lee was unable to completely destroy Pope’s force, he used this
victory as a jumping-off point for his first invasion of Union-held territory, culminating
in the Battle of Antietam on 17 September 1862. The defeat of Pope’s Army of Virginia
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also delayed the release of Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, which was
already written. Lincoln had to wait for a Union victory to release the document.48
The Second Battle of Manassas is often overlooked in Civil War historiography
but fits a larger contextual importance. Fought between the heavily studied Seven Days
Battles and the Battle of Antietam, the Second Battle of Manassas acts much like a
microcosm of the larger issues of Union command in the Virginia Theater throughout the
conflict. During the battle, the political infighting between Democratic and Republican
generals—specifically between McClellan and his protégé Porter, and Pope—as well as
egotistical and inept commanders cost the Union forces a major victory at a critical point
of the war. This defeat resulted in Pope’s removal from command and subsequent
transfer to Minnesota during the Dakota Wars in 1862. In addition, the Union defeat
shifted the momentum of the war and allowed Robert E. Lee to cross the Potomac and
launch his initial invasion of Union territory in September 1862.
Memory in the Immediate Aftermath, 1861-1910
Immediately after the fighting ended on 21 July 1861, as reports of the fight
started to pour into the War Departments and newspaper offices, the memory of the
Battle at Manassas started to form. Union officers and reporters provided explanations for
the disasterous defeat, while Confederate officers and reporters promoted the prowess of
Confederate forces.49 Only months after the fighting ended in July 1861, Confederate
soldiers built a monument to one of their fallen officers, Colonel Francis Bartow. Erected
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by the Eighth Georgia Infantry Regiment, the Bartow monument consisted of a “plain,
round marble column, about five feet in height, and one foot in diameter . . . designed to
mark the spot where [the Eighth Georgia’s] chivalric commander” fell during the battle.
The monument disappeared after the Confederates abandoned the area in early 1862.50
Even as the two armies continued the conflict, memory became an important part of the
narrative of the First Battle of Manassas, and continued after the Confederate victory
thirteen months later as well.
After the Civil War bloodletting concluded in spring 1865, memory became the
key aspect of how the country reunited. The men and women of North and South initially
used memory as a sectionally devisive tool. With approximately 750,000 men killed in
the fighting, both Northerners and Southerners attempted to deal with the devastating
casualties.51 The Northern states, having defeated the Confederacy, easily justified their
role in the conflict and the necessary cost of life in the four years. Immediately after the
war ended, Union soldiers created monuments to their fallen comrades at Manassas. In
July 1865, while the Army of the Potomac returned to Washington, D.C., from
Appomattox, the Fifth Pennsylvania Heavy Artillery constructed two sandstone
monuments, one on Henry Hill near the position held by Captain Ricketts’s battery
during the first battle, and the other on the unfinished railroad near the deep cut, the site
of the Fifth Corps’s unsuccessful assault during the second battle. Both were engraved
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with the sentiment, “In memory of the patriots who fell.”52 The Union triumph allowed
Northerners to memorialize the patriotic duty of their comrades. In addition, the overall
victory by Union forces made it easier for Northerners to come to terms with the death
toll on the battlefields.
White southerners, however, had to find a way to cope with their defeat and
justify the lives lost in battle. White southern women initially took the lead in creating a
justifiable memory. At Manassas, the Ladies’ Memorial Association of Manassas
reinterred five hundred Confederate dead in a cemetery on the grounds that had witnessed
part of Longstreet’s assault on 30 August 1862. The Groveton Confederate Cemetery
acted as a monument to the devastating losses the former Confederate states suffered at
Manassas. Similar to the deaths the majority of Southern families faced during the
conflict, only two soldiers buried at Groveton were identified. The rest were unknown
and buried in a mass grave. This common circumstance of the war, the inability to
identify the dead, led to greater grief for the people residing in the former Confederacy.
Yet the actions of groups like the Ladies’ Association were a first step in the Southerners
ability to cope with their defeat.53
In the years between 1864 and 1866, New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley
and Richmond (Va.) Examiner editor Edward A. Pollard, wrote overall histories of the
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conflict that showed sectional divisiveness. In their two books, The American Conflict
and The Lost Cause respectively, Greeley and Pollard emphasized the action of
individual officers at the battles in order to explain the outcome of the fighting, a
common theme in the memory of individual battles that veteran officers continued
through the early twentieth century. In addition, Pollard believed that the victory at First
Manassas deluded Southerners and cost them the war. He argued that the celebratory
feeling in the South after First Manassas eventually played into the hands of the
industrialized and populous North, which used the lull between July 1861 and March
1862 to “repair [the North’s] fortunes.”54 Similarly, Greely placed the blame for the
defeat in the two battles mainly on the actions of officers he disliked during the war, men
such as Generals Patterson, Scott, McClellan and Porter. Yet, his discussions of how the
battles influenced the conflict continually returned to the connection between the battles
and the conflict’s central cause, slavery.55 These initial forms of memory continued the
trend of sectional devisiveness that led to the Civil War.
While former soldiers and civilians battled over control of collective memory by
memorializing their section’s cause, former officers fought over responsibility for victory
and defeat. The most prominent battles were between former Confederate General Jubal
A. Early and his followers and Lieutenant General James Longstreet, and Union generals
John Pope and Fitz John Porter. Although a beloved general at the time of the conflict, by
the end of the nineteenth century, Longstreet had become a Southern pariah. Mainly due
to his reconciliationist stance, his acceptance of a position within the federal government,
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and his conversion to Catholicism after the war, a number of former Southern officers
attacked every decision Longstreet made during the conflict, even his successful artillery
barrage and assault on 30 August during the Second Battle of Manassas. Despite the high
quality of his leadership during the conflict, Longstreet became one of the most hated
men in the South after the conflict ended.56
On the other hand, Porter became a Union pariah in the immediate aftermath of
the Second Battle of Manassas. His apparent lack of action on 29 August and the failure
of his corps’s assault the following day convinced Pope that Porter intentionally
sabotaged his efforts to defeat the Confederates during the second battle. After an
extremely politicized court-martial proceeding, Porter was cashiered for insubordination
and removed from the army in January 1863, and he became the Republicans’s scapegoat
for the defeat at Second Manassas.57 Twenty-four years later, however, Congress
reopened the court-martial proceedings and reversed the decision from 1863. With new
testimony from former Confederate soldiers, the new court-martial decided Porter did not
disobey orders, he simply could not follow through due to the presence of Longstreet’s
men along Jackson’s right flank. After the initial decision’s reversal, Porter no longer
received sole responsibility for the federal defeat at Second Manassas.58
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These examples show the genuine power memory played in the postwar years.
One of the most beloved and highest ranking Confederate officers during the war had his
reputation ruined by the way memory portrayed his actions, and a Union officer
considered the main cause for defeat at Second Manassas had his image reversed almost
twenty-five years later.
During Reconstruction, white Southerners created the school of memory that
justified their actions in the years prior to and during the Civil War. That construction
became the accepted narrative of the conflict. Known as the Lost Cause, taken from
Pollard’s title and promoted by former Confederate president Jefferson Davis, vice
president Alexander Stephens, and general Early, this school claimed that Southern states
seceeded to protect their “States’ rights” from an over reaching and a tyrannically
powerful federal government. In addition, the Lost Cause promoted the idea that Union
manpower and industry alone were responsible for the Confederate defeat. Southern
manhood would defeat Union troops in a fair fight on any day. Similarly, this memorial
school projected negative stereotypes of Union officers, for instance portraying Union
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant as a drunk, and promoted the virtues of Confederate
leaders, picturing Lee as the ultimate chivalric gentleman soldier. Initially, these
sentiments received little support in the North. Yet, as white Northerners became
disillusioned with the Reconstruction efforts of the Radical Republicans, this memorial
school enjoyed greater acceptance throughout the nation rather than solely in the former
Confederacy.59
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By the end of Reconstruction and well into the twentieth century, the Lost Cause
became the dominant narrative of the conflict. This included how the veterans
remembered the two battles of Manassas. Entering into an era of Reconciliationist
sentiments after 1877, some veterans from both sections started to reverse the sectional
dimension of Civil War memory. By the post-Reconstruction years, the majority of
Union veterans started a movement of reconciliation by praising the fighting prowess of
Confederate as well as Union soldiers and by accepting the Lost Cause’s erasure of
slavery’s role in causing the Civil War. Union veteran John D. Stevenson believed the
second battle exemplified the combat skills of both forces. He called Pope’s Army of
Virginia the “security of Washington,” and although it was a scantily supplied and
outnumbered force, it met “face to face the best general of the Confederates, with their
best troops,” and the army “earned the laurel[s]” despite losing the battle. He disregarded
the battle’s influence on the Emancipation Proclamation.60
Many Confederate veterans, however, clung to sectional devisiveness into the first
decade of the twentieth century. For example, one Confederate veteran claimed in his
postwar writing that the Union Army of Virginia lost 20,000 men out of a total force of
80,000 men despite the Confederates only having 50,000 men available to fight during
the second battle. Also, one editor for the Confederate Veteran praised the citizens of
Alexandria, Virginia, for erecting a monument to their Confederate dead with an
inscription reading: “They died in the consciousness of duty faithfully performed.”61
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Although Confederate veterans, most likely still angry about their defeat in the Civil War,
perpetuated a memory of sectional divisiveness, many white Union veterans accepted the
Lost Cause, a choice that led to a reversal of sectional sentiments. By eliminating the
issue of slavery from the conflict, white Union veterans found more commonalities than
differences with their former adversaries. Instead of the bitter fight over whose cause was
more righteous, the veterans of both forces agreed that the valor of common soldiers
should act as the central piece of their memories, not the devisive issue that caused the
conflict.
The most prominent step towards reconciliation was the first battlefield
preservation efforts in the 1890s. The initial idea for battlefield preservation came about
during the national centennial in 1876. During this period, Congress attempted to take
action by assisting monumental organizations in funding their efforts at Revolutionary
battlefields. Congress members, however, could not agree on how to proceed in their
assitance. This idea blossomed after the national centennial in the Civil War veteran
community and led the veterans to promote Civil War sites for preservation.62 Many
soldiers who fought in the conflict believed it necessary for the federal government to
take control of the grounds over which the two forces fought. The veterans hoped that, by
preserving the grounds, future generations could learn of the soldiers’ deeds of bravery
during the heat of battle. In addition, these veterans wanted to mark the fields with
monuments and memorials to their fallen comrades and their units. These early
monuments incorporated the new Reconciliationist themes by ignoring the connection
between slavery and the conflict and by promoting the valor of both the Confederates and
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Unionists who fought the battles. These early efforts solely promoted the fighting
prowess of all American soldiers during the conflict. By emphasizing their heroism on
the battlefields, the veterans attempted to lead the way in reconciliation between the two
sections.63
Although veterans felt the government should preserve all the battlefields,
Congress agreed only to the preservation of five battlefields between 1890 and 1900.
Mainly because of pressure from politically powerful veterans, such as former Union
general Daniel Sickles and former Confederate general John Gordon, Congress preserved
these five battlefields, one to represent each “region” of the war. Chickamauga–
Chattanooga became the first federally preserved military park in 1890. In the next nine
years, Antietam, Gettysburg, Shiloh, and Vicksburg also received this new designation
and federal protection. Under the control of the War Department until 1933, these parks
served dual purposes. First, the grounds represented the initial steps toward reconciliation
in the waning years of the Civil War generation. Second, the War Department used the
preserved grounds as open-air classrooms for learning American Military History. The
decade between 1890 and 1900 represented a great leap forward in the Reconciliationist
movement started by the conflict’s veterans and the golden era of battlefield
preservation.64
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Despite Congressal willingness to preserve battlefields and the significance of the
two battles of Manassas to the greater story of the Civil War, Manassas became a
neglected battleground by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, despite the
best efforts of Manassas’ veterans who tried to push Congress into preserving the
grounds. Leading these efforts was Union veteran Lieutenant George Carr Round, a
native of Pennsylvania who received his law degree from Columbia College in New York
City after the war ended and returned to Manassas to open a firm in 1868. Having lived in
the Manassas area since 1868, Round felt a strong connection to the preservation of these
battefields. In addition, Round was a major proponent of the Reconciliationist movement
that emerged within the ranks of Union veterans after Reconstruction. During his quest
for the preservation of the Manassas battlefields, he hoped the significance of the two
battles—First Manassas being the first major battle of the war and Second Manassas
being a major turning point in Lee’s first year as commander—would easily convince
Congress to preserve the grounds. Initially, Round was unable to gain enough support
from the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), the main Union veterans society, to
convince Congress of the neccessity of Manassas’ preservation as a national battlefield or
military park. Eventually, in 1906, the GAR backed Round’s campaign, which led to
Congressional hearings on the possibility of Manassas’ preservation by 1912. Despite
setbacks stemming from lack of support, Round continued to fight for the preservation of
the two battlefields at Manassas in order to keep the memory of the battles alive for
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future generations. His efforts would go a long way in the establishment of Manassas
National Battlefield.65
Although it was not part of the initial preservation efforts of Civil War veterans,
Manassas continued to hold a place in the debate over Civil War memory during the
years between the conclusion of the Civil War and the start of the twentieth century. As a
result of the “fog of war,” confusion and myth first created the narrative of the two battles
of Manassas in the post–war years. Initially, both sides continued to emphasize sectional
distinctions. In the years following Reconstruction, however, reconciliation became the
central theme of Civil War memory for many Union veterans, while Confederates
reinforced the sectionalism of the Lost Cause. Eventually, soldiers from both sections
attempted to overlook the central cause of the conflict, slavery, in order to facilitate
national reunification. By the 1890s, white veterans pushed for federal protection of
battlefields to preserve the history for future generations and to keep the war’s memory
alive. Yet even these efforts held Reconciliationist overtones as these men erected
monuments that promoted the fighting spirit of soldiers in both forces and ignored the
role slavery played in the conflict. This was especially true of the two battles of
Manassas. As veterans wrote about the battles, they changed their tone from one of
purely sectional sentimentalities to one of reconciliation. Although Congress did not
include Manassas as part of the first wave of national battlefields and military parks,
veterans of the two battles continued to push for its preservation in the early decades of
the twentieth century. With the conciliatory stance of white veterans and the growth of

65

Rita G. Koman, “George Carr Round, 1839–1918,” George Carr Round Papers (hereafter
Round Papers), Historian’s Files, MNBPL; and Clint Schemmer, “Documents Reveal Background of
Illustrious Manassas Leader,” Potomac News (Manassas, Va.), 10 August 1988.; and Zenzen, Battling for
Manassas, 4–12.

43

ancestral groups, such as the Sons of Confederate Veterans, the United Daughters of the
Confederacy, and the Sons of Union Veterans, the Lost Cause mythology of Confederate
apologists, especially once it was accepted by white Northerners, would deeply influence
the creation of Manassas National Battlefield and the future conflicts over interpretation
of these two battles.
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Chapter 2
A Confederate Memorial the “Equal of Gettysburg”: Memory in the Creation of
Manassas National Battlefield, 1910–1940
“[H]aving the basic fact that here was fought the first great battle of the war, wherein, . .
. equal honors were won by both sides, it seems to many of us of the North that nothing
could be more fitting than the creation of the Bull Run or Manassas National Park.”
- Union veteran Alfred S. Roe, Congressional Testimony on Manassas Preservation,
19121
During a Congressional hearing on the need to preserve the grounds of Henry Hill
in 1913, Alfred S. Roe, a Union veteran who had searched the fields of Bull Run for the
shallow graves of Union troops in 1865, expressed his desire for sectional reconciliation.
“The time is coming . . . when visitors [to Manassas] will care less about who won on the
field commemorated than that they are privileged to stand where their fathers fought,
bled, and . . . died for what they deemed duty,” he declared, “irrespective of who won the
fight.”2 The former Civil War combatants were now able to forget the hatred they
possessed for each other at the time of the conflict. Yet, the establishment of Manassas
National Battlefield also provides evidence of the complexities of Civil War memory
during the early-twentieth century. Although the creation of the original five national
battlefield and military parks in the 1890s represented the conciliatory attitudes of white
Northerners and white Southerners, Manassas remained a part of sectionalist conflict.3

1

House Committee on Military Affairs, Protection of Monuments on Battle Fields of Bull Run:
Hearings on H.R. 1330, 62d Cong., 1st Sess., 1912, p. 4 (hereafter Protection of Monuments, 62d Cong.,
1st Sess.).
2
Protection of Monuments, 62d Cong., 1st Sess., 4.
3
These five battlefields were Chickamauga–Chattanooga, Gettysburg, Antietam, Shiloh, and
Vicksburg. For studies of these parks, see Jim Weeks, Gettysburg: Memory, Market, and an American
Shrine (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); Timothy B. Smith, This Great Battlefield of
Shiloh: History, Memory, and the Establishment of a Civil War National Military Park (Knoxville: The
University of Tennessee Press, 2004); Edward Tabor Linenthal, Sacred Ground: Americans and Their
Battlefields (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1991), especially chap. 3; and James A. Kaser, At the
Bivouac of Memory: History, Politics, and the Battle of Chickamauga, American University Studies (New
York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1996).

45

As historian Joan M. Zenzen has argued, the reason for the protracted process of
Manassas National Battlefield’s establishment could have been due to the results of the
battles themselves. The battlefields represent two Confederate victories, whereas the
established parks—except for Chickamauga—represented Union victories, and many
members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) and United Daughters of the
Confederacy (UDC) believed the federal government purposefully overlooked Manassas
for preservation in order to eliminate Confederate memory.4 But the most influential
years in the park’s creation—1910 to 1940—generated a history that elevated and
celebrated Confederate memory.
These years show the complex steps to the creation of Manassas National
Battlefield Park and its connection to Lost Cause mythology. After the fiftieth
anniversary commemoration in 1911, Americans became aware of the issues of
preservation and interpretation at Manassas. A number of Congressional inquiries
followed that looked into the federal government’s capabilities for Manassas’
preservation. These initial steps toward the creation of Manassas National Battlefield
Park took place during the strongest point of the reconciliationist movement. Once the
SCV and the UDC gained control of Henry Hill in 1921, however, the groups attempted
to use the grounds as part of their battle over control of Civil War memory. Although
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white Northerners had accepted the Lost Cause by the early twentieth century, SCV and
UDC suspicion of a Unionist slant to memory at the original national battlefield and
military parks caused the SCV and UDC to battle against the grounds’ incorporation as a
national battlefield. The reconciliationist legacy and the SCV’s and UDC’s ownership of
Manassas guaranteed that the Lost Cause memory of the Confederate victories at the First
and Second Battles of Manassas would survive even after the National Park Service
(NPS) took control of the grounds in 1940. Thus, the battle over memory created
Manassas National Battlefield and shows the victory of the Lost Cause mythology in
national memory.
The Manassas Peace Jubilee and Renewed Interest in Preservation, 1910–1920
In the early twentieth century, memory became the central arena for reconciliation
of North and South. By the 1910s, as the enthusiasm for preservation efforts by the
federal government waned and veterans aged and died, veterans’ groups, such as the
Grand Army of the Republic (GAR) and the United Confederate Veterans (UCV), pushed
for further preservation of Civil War battlefields.
For Manassas, Union veteran Lieutenant George Carr Round kept up the battle for
the creation of Manassas National Battlefield in the 1910s.5 Similar to other Confederate
and Union veterans, Round became part of the larger reconciliationist movement in the
early twentieth century. For example, he believed that the status of General Robert E. Lee
in the national memory showed the quality of soldiers produced in both the North and the
South. He argued, “Every inch General Lee is raised on the pedestal of fame raises Grant
5

George Carr Round, “Union Soldier Concerning the Lee Statue,” Confederate Veteran, 18, no.
11 (November 1910): 529; Rita G. Koman, “George Carr Round, 1839–1918,” George Carr Round Papers
(hereafter Round Papers), Historian’s Files, Manassas National Battlefield Park Library, Manassas, Va.
(hereafter Historian’s Files, MNBPL); and Clint Schemmer, “Documents reveal background of illustrious
Manassas leader,” Potomac News (Manassas, Va.), 10 August 1988.

47

and the Army of the Potomac, which overcame him in honorable battle,” and “The Grand
Army [of the Republic] cannot afford to judge Robert E. Lee as it would the ringleader of
a street riot.” In addition, he wrote that had Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant been
alive in 1910, “they would rejoice with me in such a restoration of the Union as is
indicated by the presence of the statue of that illustrious leader [Lee] of men in the
Capitol of the nation.”6 He saw the praise of Lee not as an insult to his commanders and
comrades in the Army of the Potomac, but as a testament to the quality of soldiers the
Union possessed during the war. His openness to judging Lee as a worthy adversary
rather than a traitorous rebel expressed his desire to heal the wounds between the two
sections.
Round was prepared to use the conflict’s memory to accomplish his
reconciliationist desire and he took advantage of the fiftieth anniversary of the First
Battle of Manassas to bring together former enemies for the first time during the
Manassas National Peace Jubilee. Although veterans had met to scour the battlefields
before, as a number of participants in the two battles had done in 1883, it had never
occurred on as large a scale as on 21 July 1911, the fiftieth anniversary. Round had a
two-fold purpose for this event: he wanted to bring former combatants together to
reconcile, and he hoped to promote Manassas for preservation by the federal
government.7 In addition to Round’s efforts, a number of Union veterans from the
Midwest supported the idea for this event in the hopes of developing “a national
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organization” of Union and Confederate veterans in place of sectional organizations such
as the GAR and UCV. This action also gained attention from Confederate veterans, one
of whom believed that “the men who favor such measures are of the better class of Union
veterans.”8 Even before the Peace Jubilee officially took place, aspects of reconciliation
emerged between Union and Confederate veterans of the battle.
In only seven months, Round, along with a committee composed of a Confederate
veteran and two Manassas residents, pieced together the logistics for the Peace Jubilee
and brought veterans from all the states involved in the fighting, as well as Virginia
governor William Hodges Mann and President William Howard Taft, to Manassas for the
commemoration. His hopes for a reconciliationist event became a reality during the Peace
Jubilee. Manassas resident Ralph Larson, who witnessed the event as a child, wrote: “On
the battlefield were two lines, Gray and Blue. They marched toward each other, shook
hands and then formed mixed twosomes, threesomes or other small groups.” He also
remembered, “There would be conversation, then pointings hither and yon, laughter and
smiles, and backslapping.”9 Confederate veteran J. T. Frazier recalled similar events.
“The gray and the blue met at the Henry House,” he wrote, “and after mingling together
for several hours formed in line facing each other, not with guns, but extended hands and
brotherly greetings. It was an inspiring scene.”10 These mock attacks between former
enemies, which became a staple for these types of reunions, displayed the ability of these
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men to reconcile the complicated differences that led to the Civil War in order to reunite
the two sections.11
For its reconciliationist purpose, the Peace Jubilee was a resounding success. All
involved saw the reunion of the two sections in the events that occurred during the
gathering at Manassas. One Confederate Veteran reporter wrote, “President Taft arrived,”
at the Manassas Courthouse around 5 o’clock, “and addressed a united people of a united
country.” He continued, “As to the meaning of all of this, there can be but one answer:
two thousand years ago the hills of Judea resounded with the angels’ song, ‘Peace on
earth and good will to men,’ and this peace jubilee is but its echo.”12 Frazier wrote that
the exhibition of reconciliation made his “heart grow tender and I thanked God for the
kindly feeling that prevailed among those men who fifty years ago met in deadly conflict
on this bloody field.” Round shared similar sentiments. He believed that the Peace
Jubilee “demonstrated to the world that finally and definitely not only the war, but the
hatred, resentment, misunderstandings and injustices which had provoked that mighty
struggle, were buried, forgotten and forever settled.”13
Despite the apparent success of the Peace Jubilee, Round’s second purpose,
federal government preservation, did not come to fruition. Throughout the process of
creating the Peace Jubilee, Round hoped that the display of goodwill between the former
combatants would show Congress and the War Department the need to preserve the two
battlefields. The event garnered national attention and Congress took immediate action to
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decide if Manassas should join the ranks of the other national battlefield and military
parks. As a result, the House Committee on Military Affairs put together a commission to
report on the need to protect the monuments that existed on the site as well as future
efforts to commemorate the fight with further monumentation to Union and Confederate
soldiers. This commission continued the reconciliationist attitudes of the veterans who
participated in the Peace Jubilee. For example, Congress agreed that any actions to build
monuments on the fields would be determined by a committee of three people. The
Congressional commission required that one Union veteran and one Confederate veteran
take part in these decisions.14
Many veterans supported Manassas’ preservation and continued to promote
reconciliation. Union veterans hoped to preserve the grounds mainly for the protection of
monuments erected on the field shortly after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox when a
regiment of Pennsylvanian’s placed sandstone obelisks on two key areas of the
battlefields. By 1911, these monuments had fallen into disrepair. Union veterans of the
battles believed federal intervention could reverse the problem. One veteran, General E.
W. Whitaker, believed the peace jubilee “fully awoke the attention of the whole country”
to the “neglected conditions of the monuments.” He thought that this exposure would
assure the success of placing Manassas under the War Department’s control.15 Even
veterans who had not participated in either of the two battles supported the inclusion of
Manassas as a national battlefield. Roe, a veteran who had missed the two Manassas
battles, expressed this by seeing the results of the battles as “equal honors won by both
sides” and this meant “nothing could be more fitting than the creation of the Bull Run or
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Manassas National Park.”16 This testimony shows the reconciliationist mind of white
Americans at the time. Despite the fierce fighting that had taken place during the two
battles, the participants and other veterans felt the plains of Manassas deserved federal
protection to provide a place for people to visit and remember the historic actions of their
ancestors, both Union and Confederate.
Following these testimonies on the bill, H.R. 1330, the Committee on Military
Affairs returned to the House of Representatives with a decision on 8 February 1913. The
committee members recommended that H.R. 1330 pass but that a piece of the legislation
should change beforehand. They suggested that the proposal include a clause that stated,
“[T]he Secretary of War is hereby directed to inquire into the practicability of purchasing
the land upon which . . . [the] monuments stand.” The members believed that “some steps
should be taken to protect the monuments” but that “full information should be had”
before purchasing the grounds.17
In response, a board of officers from the War Department visited the battlefields
to gather information and make a report on the status of the monuments. The officers
agreed that the federal government should take control of the grounds along Henry Hill
and the unfinished railroad grade where the two monuments sat. They also supposed that
in order to purchase the monument on Henry Hill it was necessary to acquire the entire
farm. They argued this was warranted since the grounds included the monument and
“many points of historic interest in connection with both the first and second battles of
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Bull Run.”18 This report, however, arrived in the House of Representatives at the worst
possible moment. Submitted to the House in December 1913, it arrived just as tensions in
Europe between the great powers increased and the federal government turned its
attention to the foreign crisis. Once the First World War erupted, the recommendations
made by the board of officers became an afterthought and Manassas was once again
neglected.
While the United States turned its eye to Europe, Congress relegated the
preservation of battlefields to the immaterial. Congress created only five national
battlefield or military parks in the years between 1900 and 1925, as opposed to five in the
ten years between 1890 and 1900.19 The hopes for the creation of Manassas National
Battlefield, however, did not die despite the start of the First World War.
Round continued his unwavering advocacy for the battlefields’ preservation. He
wrote Confederate Veteran in 1917 to request that the readers’ petition their
Congressmen to support the bill for the establishment of a national battlefield at
Manassas. Including the need to preserve the grounds around the Henry and Dogan
farms, he approved of the preservation of the Groveton Confederate Cemetery, which
also supported his reconciliationism. Despite the events in Europe taking precedence over
domestic issues in the years after the Peace Jubilee, veterans, especially Round,
continued to push for the preservation of the grounds fought over in 1861 and 1862.20
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Support for a new battlefield at Manassas dwindled in the final years of the First
World War. By the late 1910s, an increasing number of veterans died, which resulted in
the political weakening of groups such as the GAR and the UCV. The Manassas
preservation effort lost its biggest supporter when Round died on 5 November 1918.21
Thus heritage groups, such as the SCV, UDC, and the Sons of Union Veterans (SUV),
became the backers for battlefield preservation. In Manassas’s case, this resulted in the
reemergence of sectionalist tensions in memory once the SCV and UDC took control of
the grounds.
Manassas Battlefield Confederate Park and the Lost Cause, 1920–1930
In the 1920s, Manassas became a symbol for the SCV’s and UDC’s battles over
Civil War memory. Although the majority of Union veterans wanted the grounds
preserved to protect the monuments that existed and honor both Union and Confederate
soldiers, the SCV and UDC wished to turn the Manassas battlefields into a solely
Confederate monument. As one member wrote, “It is hoped the enterprise will interest
the entire South.” He also believed that it could act as “one great monumental memorial
park” to the South that “is within easy reach of Washington and when known will be seen
by thousands each year.”22 By October 1920, the Manassas chapter of the UDC had the
opportunity to buy the lands known as Henry Hill and a “battle museum”—the rebuilt
Henry House—for twenty-five thousand dollars. Many of the SCV and UDC members
supported the purchase of the grounds. They believed that if action was not taken
immediately “some of the most thrilling and inspiring incidents of that battle will pass
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into oblivion,” including the spot on Henry Hill where Jackson received his sobriquet.23
The grounds represented to the Confederate heritage groups a key component of their
battle for supremacy in Civil War memory.
One year after it received the opportunity, the Manassas chapter of the UDC
moved on its option to purchase the grounds around the Henry House. During a meeting
held on 5 March 1921 in Washington, D.C., the SCV and UDC created the corporation
that purchased and took control of the park’s operations. Known as the Manassas Battle
Field Association and headed by Maj. E. W. R. Ewing, a former historian-in-chief of the
SCV, the group was charged with purchasing Henry Hill, the central area of fighting
during First Manassas, for twenty-five thousand dollars. Also, it would raise money for
“monuments and suitable markers” to pay tribute to areas it felt were “historic and sacred
to the South.” The board’s final purpose was to “accept markers or monuments offered
by any State or organization, thus making it possible for Northern States or Union army
units to mark spots of peculiar interest to the North.”24 The corporation’s board consisted
of one member from the depleting ranks of the UCV, one member each from the SCV,
UDC, the Confederated Southern Memorial Association, and “each Southern State,
including Missouri, Maryland, and Kentucky.”25 The possibility for the boards’
acceptance of Union monuments hinted at an apparent reconciliationist attitude of the
Manassas Battle Field Association. The exclusion of Union groups such as the GAR and
SUV, however, indicated that the SCV and UDC, as the main ancestral organizations
behind the creation and running of Manassas Battle Field Association, intended the park
to be a monument solely to the Confederates and the Lost Cause.
23
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Other members of the SCV and UDC continued to view Manassas as a
purposefully neglected symbol of Confederate triumphs. One Confederate Veteran editor
believed the efforts by the SCV and UDC to purchase the Henry Hill tract was “turning
the eyes of the South toward that historic and now sadly neglected spot.” The writer,
similar to other members of the SCV and UDC, saw a lack of action by the federal
government as a slight against Confederate memory. He noticed similar insults through
the existing monuments on the grounds when he wrote, “There is not a substantial marker
indicating a single spot dear to the South.” “On the other hand,” the author continued,
“several splendid and towering granite shafts have been here and there erected by Federal
units in honor of their dead, particularly on the main field of Second Manassas,” referring
to the monuments to the Fifth and Tenth New York Infantry Regiments. The writer
finished by asking, “Is the Southern cause less worthy or the Southern dead less precious
to our memories?”26 It was apparent to the members of the SCV and UDC that the U.S.
government would answer this question with a resounding yes. Yet at the time of these
sentiments, the Manassas Battle Field Association acted to secure the property of Henry
Hill and eventually fought against federal control of the grounds.
By June 1921, the Manassas Battle Field Association leased and incorporated
Henry Hill into the Manassas Battlefield Confederate Park. The group intended the use of
the park for “charitable and educational purposes,” such as maintaining “monument[s] or
otherwise mark said land . . . in memory of the brave dead and wounded of both
armies.”27 Presenting the park as a monument to both forces seemed to indicate a
reconciliationist stance by the Manassas Battle Field Association. Additional clauses in
26
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the incorporation document, however, suggest other aims behind the corporation’s desire
for ownership of the grounds. In addition to their hopes of using the park as a memorial
to the “dead and wounded of both armies,” the association included as part of the
charitable and educational uses for the land that “said land m[a]y stand as a perpetual
park as the South’s memorial to all Confederate soldiers of that war and as an expression
of Southern love and veneration of the glorious and devoted women of the South during
that dreaded era.”28
Major Ewing, as head of the Manassas Battle Field Association, outlined a similar
purpose in his prospectus for interpretation at the park. He argued that at parks such as
Gettysburg and Chickamauga “there [was] nowhere shaft or marker, the gift of a great
and devoted South, to remind the future that the South of the era of secession was always
and to the last more truly and sanely anti-slavery than the North.”29 Thus, he believed the
“sacred” battlefields at Manassas would act in the “interest of historical truth,” as well as
be a monument that stood as a representation of the “inalienable right of revolution, a
right comprehended by the secession for which the South fought.” Interpretation at the
park would especially ensure that “particularly the children of the South may the better
understand such important results of the war between the Confederacy and the Federal
Government” according to SCV and UDC teachings. According to the SCV’s catechism,
similar to the UDC’s view, the narrative of the war they presented, which included
interpretation at Manassas, did not include slavery as a main cause of secession. In
addition, the group placed all the blame for the start of the war on the Lincoln
administration and the Northern states, and continued the tradition of explaining
28
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Confederate motivation for secession as the violation of the South’s “states rights.”30
Despite the initial references to reconciliationist ideals, the creators of Manassas
Battlefield Confederate Park wished to use Manassas as a bulwark of Lost Cause
memory. Although men like Round desired the preservation of the battlefields to honor
the veterans of both sections, the declarations in the documents that greatly influenced the
creation of Manassas Battlefield Confederate Park guaranteed that the Lost Cause
rhetoric would trump the reconciliationist attitudes of the veterans in the early twentieth
century.
Manassas Battlefield Confederate Park opened to the public with the rebuilt
Henry House used as the park’s headquarters and museum in the summer of 1921. The
Manassas Battlefield Association, however, had a number of issues that the members of
the SCV and UDC wanted them to immediately address. Most importantly was the
erection of a marker at the spot where, many believed, General Jackson had received his
sobriquet, Stonewall, on the crest of Henry Hill. As one of the martyrs of the Lost Cause,
Jackson was a central icon to the majority of Confederate descendants, especially because
of his services at Manassas. His apparent position—at the top of Henry Hill—had been
marked with a cedar tree in the years after the war. By the time of Manassas Battlefield
Confederate Park’s creation, however, the cedar had started to die and members of the
SCV and UDC asked, “Is not the spot worthy of a more creditable marker and memorial
tablet?” The result these members feared was that “Jackson’s terrible bayonet charge
will, if something is not done quickly, soon be little appreciated.” Reflecting on this
possibility in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the author of this editorial
30
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added that “Jackson and his men then and there taught the world a lesson in the art of war
that did much to help America win on the bloody fields of distant France.”31 Financial
troubles, however, prevented the association from erecting a new monument to Jackson
during the SCV’s and UDC’s ownership of the land.
By the end of 1921, the SCV and UDC finalized the purchase of Henry Hill and
even looked to add twenty acres to Manassas Battlefield while building a new museum
for the park. Similar to the hopes Major Ewing wrote into his prospectus, Manassas
became a shrine to the Lost Cause and the Confederacy. The members of the SCV and
UDC promoted Manassas as a Southern answer to already established national parks,
which they believed advocated the “Unionist” narrative of the Civil War. They hoped that
Manassas would be a “memorial the equal of Gettysburg and Chickamauga,” but a
champion for the Confederacy. The supporters of Manassas Confederate Battlefield
asked for donations to build a museum, walking trails, roads, and monuments to the
Confederate victory at First Manassas. Most importantly, the author of the article
soliciting donations included the fact that the park was “under the direction and control of
Southern men.”32 This article from the Confederate Veteran showed a major issue that
the SCV and UDC had with their preservation of the Manassas battlefields. The price for
the groups to preserve the grounds proved problematic. The SCV and UDC, however,
were both determined to keep the grounds under their control to promote the Lost Cause
mythology.
The SCV’s and UDC’s financial problems did not stop the groups from applying
the Lost Cause interpretation. In the years between the park’s initial establishment and
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1930, when the federal government renewed its interest in preserving the grounds, the
Manassas Battle Field Association received multiple donations, usually for about ten
thousand dollars, from the state of Virginia in order to retain the park. For the members
of the SCV and UDC, the preservation of Lost Cause mythology equaled the solicitation
of financial aid to preserve Manassas Confederate Battlefield. One editorial argued that it
was “up to us of the South to make [the park] a memorial field worthy of the great deeds
our ancestors performed there.”33 Major Ewing redeployed his Lost Cause rhetoric at
Manassas in a pamphlet written to secure donations from Southerners. He believed
Manassas would fulfill the debt that “Descendants of Confederate soldiers” owed their
ancestors. He argued that they owed their ancestors “at least one fitting battlefield
memorial” that was “emphatically Confederate in perpetual emphasis; and teaching
without bitterness or prejudice, of that for which the Confederacy fought.”34
“Descendants of Confederate soldiers” were not the only ones to promote the Lost
Cause mythology by the mid-1920s. Many white Northerners had accepted the Lost
Cause as the main interpretation of the Civil War as well. Indeed, a lawyer from Chicago
supported the SCV’s and UDC’s work in preserving the memory of the Confederacy,
which included the ownership of Manassas battlefield. When referencing a memorial to a
Southern judge, the lawyer wrote:
This fine tribute to one of our greatest American jurists [Chief Justice
Edward Douglass White], a distinguished son of the South, ought to
remind particularly all Southerners that we too little appreciate the value
of conserving the inspiration that the future should have from memorials
33
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of Confederate purpose and principle quite as much as of unsurpassed
heroism. . . . I have long been impressed with the need of some
permanently endowed source of funds to be used to further more general
appreciation of that purpose and principle.35
With the general acceptance of the Confederate narrative, Northerners promoted the use
of this story at Manassas Confederate Battlefield Park in addition to the established
tradition by the SCV and UDC.36
Throughout the SCV and UDC ownership of Henry Hill, the Manassas Battlefield
Association endorsed Lost Cause mythology that influenced the future interpretation of
the park. Major Ewing believed that Manassas needed to encompass a “symbol of
Confederate purpose and valor,” and that it, in the “interest of broader Americanism,”
served a “fuller story of the South’s contribution to government and history.”
Additionally, Ewing admitted that Manassas pushed a Confederate interpretation to
counter the perceived “wonderful story” that “[T]he federals have told in marble and
bronze” at other battlefield sites. In reference to the second battle, “Nothing [at
Manassas] recalls to the visitor that fine Southern courage which thus triumphed over
numbers and resources, nor of the brilliant strategy by which Lee brought on that battle.”
Manassas provided, in Ewing’s mind, an opportunity to speak of Confederate valor, such
as the stand by Evans’s troops along Matthew’s Hill and General Johnston’s rallying of
troops along Henry Hill. The key to interpretation at Manassas, for Ewing, was to present
“correctly the causes and right” of their ancestors’ “brilliant fight.”37 Although previously
established parks contained Lost Cause leanings in their memorialization of the battles,
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the SCV and UDC hoped that Manassas Confederate Battlefield would act as a purely
Southern park for all posterity.38
By the mid-1920s, the federal government renewed its efforts to preserve new
national military parks under the control of the War Department, especially the neglected
battlefields of Virginia. With a petition from a number of Manassas residents, including
B. Lynn Robertson, a member of the local SCV chapter, and backed by Virginia
congressman R. Walter Moore, Congress reconsidered the acceptance of Manassas as a
national battlefield. A number of SCV and UDC members, however, fought against
transferring Manassas to the control of the War Department, fearing that the federal
government would interpret the battles with the Unionist favor that they saw in
previously established parks. But in response to the petition, the House Committee on
Military Affairs once again permitted the Secretary of War to put together a commission
to inspect the battlefields and present a report on the viability of the purchase of the
grounds by the federal government.39
The news of the commission received conflicting responses from members of the
SCV and UDC. Robertson supported the desire to turn Manassas into a national military
park. He believed that the majority of SCV and UDC members would “concur in the bill
[to create Bull Run National Military Park] and support it.” In addition, he hoped to assist
the Committee on Military Affairs in their efforts to bring Manassas under the control of
the War Department.40 Other SCV and UDC members, however, did not envision this
38
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exchange of control as positively as Robertson supposed. One member responded with
the question, “Is this park to memorialize Confederate valor and history or not?”41 Ewing
believed that the SCV and UDC needed to turn Manassas into “the Gettysburg of the
South.” Since the “Confederate South ha[d] not memorialized a single battlefield,” the
groups “must not leave to the Federal Government all such memorials! We MUST build
at least one on the famous fields of Manassas – historical, beautiful, symbolic of all for
which the Confederacy stood!”42
A private letter from Ewing to Congressman Moore in February 1927, shortly
prior to Ewing’s death, further demonstrates the backlash from members of the SCV and
UDC to the proposed Bull Run National Military Park. He wrote the congressman to
“register” his “most ardent protest against this movement.” Ewing continued that “the
fewer ‘Damnedyankee’ monuments I see in Virginia the better I am pleased.” In addition,
he argued, the inscriptions on these monuments to Union soldiers were “decidedly
objectionable to Southerners who know any thing about the history of the period of the
war between the States.” Ewing feared that government intervention at Manassas would
lead to the Unionist leanings he perceived existed in previous monuments at other
battlefields. His alarm stemmed from an event at Manassas, most likely the Peace Jubilee,
where he heard George Carr Round speak. According to Ewing, by listening to the
speeches, especially Round’s, the crowd “might easily have thought that the Northern
armies had thoroughly beaten the south in both battles.” Ewing felt, “This is wat [sic]
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may be expected, if your movement succeeds.”43 Although Robertson believed that
members of the SCV and UDC would support the incorporation of Manassas Confederate
Battlefield into the War Department’s system of parks, the majority of members felt the
transfer of ownership would ruin the work they had done in order to present the Lost
Cause mythology at Manassas.
By the end of the decade, the SCV and UDC finally gained full ownership of the
128 acres of land around the Henry House. Financial issues, however, still plagued the
SCV and UDC ownership throughout the 1930s. But mistrust of the federal government,
especially after the key player in preservation of Manassas at this point—Major Ewing—
died in 1927, prevented immediate action by the federal government to preserve the
Manassas battlefields and derailed the park’s creation in the following decade.44
The Establishment of Manassas National Battlefield Park, 1930–1940
The SCV’s and UDC’s financial troubles led some of the members of the park’s
Board of Trustees to question the effort, and they started to consider seriously
relinquishing control to the War Department. In the years between 1926 and 1933, when
the NPS became the agency to administer the national military and battlefield parks,
Congress designated fourteen new areas as national parks. This included Petersburg
National Military Park (1926) and Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania County Battlefields
43

E. W. R. Ewing to R. Walton [sic] Moore, 28 February 1927, Ballston, Va., MBCP Folder,
Historian’s Files, MNBPL.
44
For the finalization of the purchase of Henry Hill by the SCV and UDC, see “Donation from
Stonewall Chapter, U. D. C.,” Confederate Veteran, 37, no. 2 (February 1929): 77; “Manassas Battle Field
Confederate Park,” Confederate Veteran, 37, no. 6 (June 1929): 236; “Funds to Clear Manassas Battle
Field,” Confederate Veteran, 37, no. 7 (July 1929): 276–77; “Pledges to Liquidate Indebtedness of
Manassas Battle Field Park,” Confederate Veteran, 37, no. 9 (September 1929): 356–57; “Manassas
Battlefield Celebration,” Confederate Veteran, 38, no. 8 (August 1930): 324; and Zenzen, Battling for
Manassas, 16. For the issues that prevented the transferal of control to the NPS after Ewing’s death, see
Edmond R. Wiles to Park Service Director Horace M. Albright, 23 June 1933, Little Rock, Ark., Manassas
Battlefield Military Park Papers, Box 2596a, Entry 7, National Park Service Classified Files, 1933–1949,
Records of the National Park Service, Record Group 79, National Archives and Records Administration II,
College Park, Maryland (hereafter MBMP, Box 2596a, Entry 7, NPS Classified Files, RG 79, NARA II).

64

Memorial National Military Park (1927), both in Virginia. Manassas continued to gain
recognition from Congress in terms of preservation under federal authority, but it also
remained neglected even with the renewed interest in the memorialization of Civil War
battlefields. In 1931, the War Department commissioned a committee of engineers to
examine the conditions of the Manassas battlefields. Dealing with Great Depression
economic issues, however, became the major concern of Congress, and plans for the park
to become federally protected were once again deserted.45
By 1933 once the NPS became administrators of the national military and
battlefield parks, Branch Spalding, the regional director of the Park Service in Virginia,
began discussing the project of Manassas National Battlefield with his colleagues as well
as the SCV and UDC. Even with their financial troubles, the members of the SCV and
UDC focused their efforts on marking the fields and erecting monuments. Edmond R.
Wiles, the man placed in charge of “beautifying” Manassas by the Manassas Battle Field
Association in 1933, wrote that the groups wanted the monuments and markers to pay
“tribute to both the leaders of the Confederacy and those from the North – but to be
predominantly a Confederate park.”46 But in a follow up letter, he promoted the
ignorance of Union contributions to the battle. He explained that the SCV and UDC
hoped to erect new monuments at the site of Stonewall Jackson’s nicknaming, to each of
the Confederate generals who commanded troops, and to each of the units in the
Confederate forces during the two battles.47 Despite the financial trouble that came with
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the preservation of the lands on Henry Hill, the SCV and UDC consistently promoted the
memory and preservation of the battles with a Lost Cause leaning. Clearly, although the
members claimed on a number of occasions they supported reconciliationist ideas about
preservation, they actually ignored the Union actions at the battles.
Regardless of the obvious Lost Cause emphasis supported by the SCV and UDC
and their mistrust of the NPS’s interpretation of the war, the SCV, which had taken
control of the negotiations with the federal government, did consider donating the lands
to the NPS. In an attempt to retain control of Manassas’s preservation, the SCV tried to
obtain funds from the “Public Works bill,” but it was refused. This resulted in the SCV
entering into more serious dialogues about the transfer of power over the grounds. In
September 1933, the SCV gathered for its annual meeting. Wiles hoped that the group
would agree to give Manassas battlefield to the NPS. But the SCV rejected this measure
at the meeting as a result of the groups’ mistrust of the NPS, and, by 1935, the
discussions over the possibility of donating the park had stalled. SCV and UDC members
still perceived or feared Unionist bias in the NPS when the discussions took place.48 The
consequence of this suspicion was a resolution from the SCV and the UCV in 1935 that
declared the groups “unalterably opposed” the “transfer of all or any part . . . of the
Manassas Battlefield . . . to either a state or to the National Government.”49 By the mid1930s, it seemed that the mistrust the Confederate heritage groups held for the NPS
would prevent the creation of a national park at Manassas.
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While battling with the NPS for the right to ownership of the property along
Henry Hill, the SCV and UDC maintained the original objective as spelled out by Major
Ewing in the early 1920s. The Manassas Battle Field Association hoped to make
Manassas into the “most beautiful Memorial Park in all the South,” one that would be
“emphatically Confederate in perpetual emphasis; and teaching without bitterness or
prejudice that for which the Confederacy fought.”50 In other federally administered
memorial parks, the SCV saw a very different interpretation dedicated to “American
battle genius,” but not including “the name of a single Southern hero” and lacking
“proper Confederate recognition and emphasis.”51 These perceived insults against and
deliberate omissions of Confederate history and heroes caused the SCV’s and UDC’s
distrust of the NPS and its role in the promotion of Civil War memory.
A year after the SCV unanimously refused to donate the grounds to the NPS,
however, the group renewed debating the issue. Regional Director Spalding attended this
meeting to present the NPS’s argument for the establishment of Manassas as a national
park. But, according to Spalding, the opposition to the NPS was “astonishingly violent.”
“If I could have foreseen what an under taking it was,” he continued, “I should hardly
have had the courage to attempt the swinging of this thing.” Yet after three days of bitter
debate, the SCV passed a new resolution that approved the property’s donation to the
NPS. Although Spalding accomplished the objective of bringing the grounds of Manassas
under the control of the NPS, he also noticed the distrust members of the group held for
the agency. He wrote, “It is truly surprising how the old feeling lingers in the hearts of
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our Southern people.”52 Not only were the members of the SCV suspicious of the NPS,
they still held a grudge against the federal government originating in the Civil War.
Even after the SCV agreed to donate the lands to the NPS, the process of creating
Manassas National Battlefield still had a ways to go. After the NPS and SCV agreed to
the donation, the two sides debated the inclusion and exclusion of certain clauses in the
deed of transferal. Specifically, they argued over passages that supported the existing
Lost Cause interpretation of the two battles. Clear throughout the deed is that the SCV
required that the park remain as “Manassas Battlefield,” the name used by Confederates
after the battles. The NPS and SCV debated most over the twenty-five thousand dollar
requirement for a new memorial to Stonewall Jackson near the spot where he “received
his immortal title.” To finalize Jackson’s importance to the Lost Cause at Manassas, the
deed included a clause about the monument, which required that it “be in keeping with
the greatness of the man honored.” In addition, the document mandated that monuments
to Colonel Francis S. Bartow and General Barnard E. Bee of the Confederate army be
placed near the spots where they were mortally wounded during the first battle. Each
monument had to cost at least ten-thousand dollars. Additionally, the deed’s initial draft
compelled the agency to set up a commission to review and approve any future
monuments. Consisting of four Virginians and one additional Southerner approved by the
commander in chief of the SCV, the commission’s job was to make sure that no
“markers, monuments or inscriptions” on the property would “detract in any way from
the glory due the Confederate heroes.”53 Of course the NPS could not fulfill all the

52

Branch Spaulding to Director Horace M. Albright, 11 June 1936, Shreveport, La., MBMP, Box
2596a, Entry 7, NPS Classified Files, RG 79, NARA II.
53
Preliminary Draft of Deed between the SCV and NPS entitled “This Deed,” 1936, MBMP, Box
2596a, Entry 7, NPS Classified Files, RG 79, NARA II.

68

clauses that the SCV required. The main sticking issue in this initial draft, however, was
the purchase of the monuments to Jackson, Bartow, and Bee. The NPS removed the
clause that required them to pay for these monuments and the clause that created the
commission of four Virginians and one Southerner to approve new monuments. Yet the
NPS allowed the requirement of inscriptions that would not “detract . . . from the glory
due the Confederate heroes.”54 Even after the SCV approved the federal control of the
lands at Manassas, the fight over the battles’ memory went on through the process of
transferal.
The steps to the creation of Manassas National Battlefield Park in the years
between 1936 and 1940 became more cohesive, but the SCV and UDC persisted in their
efforts to keep the Lost Cause mythology alive at Manassas. During the seventy-fifth
anniversary, 21 July 1936, the SCV, UDC, and NPS teamed up to reenact the battle for
the people of Virginia. This reenactment provides evidence of the depth to which the Lost
Cause had become the common narrative of the battles. In a speech given during the
event, an unknown speaker refused to acknowledge the reason the two armies met at
Manassas on 21 July 1861. This speaker also focused on the work of the NPS to preserve
battle sites purely for lessons in military history. Most tellingly in the speech, the speaker
states, “In commemorating the event which took place here seventy-five years ago today,
we have no desire to recall a victory or excuse a defeat.”55 Instead they were there to
celebrate the glory of both Northern and Southern soldiers. In addition, the pamphlet
from the event ignores the causes of the war and focuses only on the military situation
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and actions while emphasizing the perceived difference in numerical strength between
the Union and Confederate forces, a strong aspect of the Lost Cause mythology.56 A
newspaper reporter at the event noted the Lost Cause sympathies of the crowd as well. He
wrote that one young boy “was heard above the din of battle to yell . . . ‘The Yankees are
cheating! The dead ones are getting up and fighting again.’” Also, he reported that:
“There was no display of animosity during the battle but it was easy to observe where the
sympathies of the spectators lay. Some of the audience twisted and fidgeted when the
Federals seemed to be gaining the advantage and there were cheers, hurrahs and applause
when the Confederates turned back the persistent charges and swept the ‘enemy’ from the
field with a bristling bayonet charge.”57 Not only did the work of the SCV and UDC
influence the Lost Cause interpretation at Manassas, but the public embracement of the
Lost Cause in general also caused this support of the Southern interpretation of the two
battles and the conflict at Manassas.
Although the NPS and the SCV had agreed to a preliminary deed, distrust from
members of the SCV and UDC and restrictions on the deed, specifically the requirement
that the NPS have the funds to build a museum on the site prior to receiving the donation,
prevented the full transfer of control for almost three years. Additionally, a new faction of
opponents within the SCV rose to work against the donation. This group, according to
Spalding, was “well organized for an effort to have the resolution [of 11 July 1936]
rescinded.” He wrote, “Their reason seems to be an impression that the National Park
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Service . . . would show favoritism to the Union forces.”58 This debate over the way the
Park Service would interpret the battles and the SCV’s desire for the construction of a
museum prior to the park’s transfer held up the execution of the deed through 1937 and
1938. Yet, the NPS prepared to take control of Manassas Battlefield and in 1939 created
its first master plan, which supported the Lost Cause tradition of the battlefield. Although
the plan claimed that it was “more important” to present the “meaning and significance of
the historic events than to explain them as a military study,” the author believed that the
NPS also should “interpret the area and the battles for the benefit and the inspiration of
the American people.” Nowhere in this master plan did the author specifically include the
need to present the true cause of secession and the war to the visitor. Instead it focused
mainly on the “Historical narrative of the two battles.”59 The Unionist favoritism
perceived by the SCV and UDC in NPS interpretation at other battlefields would not
affect the narrative of the battles of Manassas for the NPS specifically instituted aspects
of the Lost Cause in its master plan for the park.
By the end of 1939, Congress had approved fifty-six thousand dollars for the
construction of a museum on the grounds at Manassas Battlefield. Simultaneously, the
State of Virginia had appropriated twenty-five thousand dollars for the erection of a new
monument to Stonewall Jackson near the spot of his nicknaming. Thus, by the end of
April 1940, the NPS prepared to execute the deed for transfer and to interpret the battles
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at Manassas. On 10 May 1940, the NPS officially announced the establishment of
Manassas National Battlefield Park.60
Three months after the official establishment of Manassas National Battlefield,
the SCV and UDC finally received their wish for a new marker to Stonewall Jackson and
their Lost Cause legacy. Since the SCV and UDC took control of the grounds in 1921, the
two groups wanted to erect a monument to Jackson to replace the existing cedar tree.
With the twenty-five thousand dollars appropriated by the State of Virginia, their dream
became a reality. In 1939, the state’s Fine Arts Commission sponsored a competition to
decide who would design this monument to one of the South’s greatest heroes. Joseph
Pollia, the sculptor of multiple military figures including Union general Philip Sheridan,
won the contest with an equestrian statue of Jackson on his horse, “Little Sorrell.”
Although he initially received criticism for Little Sorrell’s size (many people believed
Sorrell looked too weak) and the statue’s face in the initial mold (many claimed it
resembled Ulysses S. Grant not Jackson), Pollia created a massive statue to this Lost
Cause martyr.61
The Park Service unveiled the statue on 31 August 1940 to a crowd of two
thousand. Positioned along the top of the ridge to the front of Jackson’s actual position on
Henry Hill facing the Union lines, the monument consists of an eight- to ten-foot-tall
bronze statue of Jackson straddling Little Sorrell atop an eight-foot black granite base, in
60
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which is etched Bee’s immortal—possibly aprocryphal—words, “There stands Jackson
like a stone wall! Rally around the Virginians!” The ceremony consisted of speeches
from Virginia governor J. Roy Price and, most prominently, Douglas Southall Freeman,
the preeminent Confederate historian at that time. In addition, the ceremony included the
draping of Confederate flags on the monument, which sparked much debate in the NPS
prior to the ceremony.62
The erection of the Stonewall Jackson monument permanently instituted the Lost
Cause mythology at Manassas National Battlefield. As one spectator observed, a “large
crowd assembled” to “pay honor to one of the greatest soldiers of any age – a military
leader . . . recognized by emulation in every war college in the world,” and a man, he
believed, who “[s]urely . . . is important enough to have a memorial in granite and bronze
all to himself.”63 In his speech, Governor Price declared that Jackson was “one of the
greatest soldiers of the Anglo-Saxon race.” In addition, with the United States on the
brink of entering the Second World War, Dr. Freeman believed that the citizens of the
U.S. had to “rededicate and reconsecrate ourselves to the principles and ideals so
beautifully exemplified in the life and service of Stonewall Jackson.”64 The monument
itself also contains not-so-subtle messages about the Lost Cause. The representation of
Jackson presents him as a large, muscular figure on a large steed, which represents Little
Sorrell, although Jackson was of a slight build and Little Sorrell was slightly larger than a
62
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plow horse. Additionally, the statue consists of Jackson wearing a “raincoat,” which
looks more like a cape worn by a noble musketeer. Following along the same lines,
Jackson’s stance has a striking resemblance to one that can be found in many Superman
comics or cartoons.65 The statements made by Price and Freeman, as well as the
monument itself, show that the Lost Cause mythology, which had infiltrated the
nationwide interpretation of the Civil War, would be perpetually represented by the
Jackson statue at Manassas National Battlefield.
The Stonewall Jackson statue epitomizes the complicated struggle and the Lost
Cause legacy of Manassas National Battlefield’s creation. This large monument
dominates Henry Hill, guaranteeing that this Lost Cause martyr remains the focal point of
the site memorializing the First Battle of Manassas. Yet it was never guaranteed that
Manassas would become a part of the NPS system. The SCV’s and UDC’s suspicion of
federal interpretation that “eliminated” Confederate memory prevented the park from
joining the ranks of other national parks for decades. Despite the perceived Unionist slant
at other battlefields, the popularity of Lost Cause mythology by the 1920s and 1930s,
which is demonstrated by the success of Freeman’s works on Robert E. Lee and his
subordinates as well as the movie Gone With the Wind (1939), guaranteed that the Lost
Cause would remain the primary framework for interpretation at Manassas. The Jackson
monument stands as a reminder of this battle over Civil War memory in Manassas’s
establishment as a national battlefield and throughout the nation.66
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Chapter 3
“So the Centennial Observance Must Be a New Study of American Patriotism”:
Memory in Manassas Battlefield’s Initial Development and the Centennial, 19411970
“It goes without saying that where fables and legends have obscured the real truth, the
truth must be made clear. We are not preparing to commemorate a romantic myth; we
are making ready to look closer at a chapter of our own history, and the chapter must be
accurate.”
- Civil War Centennial Commission, Statement of Objectives and Suggestion for Civil
War Centennial Commemorations, 19581
On a hot summer day, the Union artillery rode to the top of Henry Hill unlimbered
and began firing on their Confederate opposition. A line of Confederate cannons returned
fire as the Union infantry attempted to establish a position along the hill’s crest. After
only a couple of hours, the seemingly victorious Union army fled toward the safety of
Washington, D.C. Suddenly, a cheer went up through the crowd witnessing the struggle.
This scene seems to come directly out of the fighting that took place on 21 July 1861.
These events, however, describe the exhilaration of thousands of visitors and reenactors
at Manassas National Battlefield on 22 and 23 July 1961, the weekend of the first battle’s
one-hundredth anniversary. What started as the epitome of centennial commemoration,
Manassas’ celebration of the 1861 battle, the first major reenactment during the Civil
War Centennial, became a turning point in the nationwide celebration and the park’s
history.
Although the Civil War’s popularity waned in the aftermath of World War II, the
Civil War Centennial reversed this trend as the work of popular historians, especially
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Bruce Catton and Shelby Foote, brought renewed attention to the conflict.2 The majority
of white Americans initially embraced the coming celebration of the war, especially since
the conflict’s memory had become less divisive since the late nineteenth century. As the
1960s approached, however, the increased power of the Civil Rights Movement created a
more complicated commemoration than initially expected, which once again turned the
Civil War’s memory into a divisive cultural and political battleground.
The celebration of First Manassas’ centennial garnered major attention throughout
the nation as the Civil Rights Movement continued to grow in the South. As the epicenter
of the first major events commemorating the Civil War Centennial, the Manassas
centennial reenactment started a firestorm of debates over how the conflict should be
remembered and what the Civil War truly meant to the United States. The tumultuous
decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s would reverse the common narrative of Civil
War history. The Civil Rights Movement, a resurgence in scholarship on slavery, and the
emergence of a far more “liberal” academy focused on the racial aspects of the
antebellum years and the connection to the Civil War, complicated public presentation of
the conflict’s story after the 1960s.3
As seen through the unveiling of the Stonewall Jackson statue at Manassas in
1940, few Americans continued to fight over Civil War memory on sectional terms. The
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majority of white Americans accepted the Lost Cause as the central narrative for the
conflict. By the time of the Second World War preservation and interpretation at
Manassas reflected this shared perception of the war. The National Park Service (NPS)
presented an interpretation of the Civil War in strictly military terms and continued to
ignore the influence of slavery in the war’s outbreak. Although NPS resources had been
reduced during the Second World War, they continued the construction of the new visitor
center on Henry Hill and completed it in 1942.
After the completion of the Visitor Center in 1942, expansion and changes in
interpretation remained dormant throughout the 1940s at Manassas. Reduced interest in
the conflict led to smaller visitation at battlefield sites and less motivation for
improvements. Using the original narrative texts set up by the Works Progress
Administration and Civilian Conservation Corps in the 1930s, Manassas installed
permanent interpretive markers in 1948; these pieces remained in place for almost twenty
years. In addition, the museum inside the Visitor Center emphasized Lost Cause
mythology throughout the 1940s and into the 1950s. Lack of funding for new projects
was the main culprit for this stasis, but a lack of scholarly questioning of the Lost Cause
also played a role throughout the 1940s. The emergence of African American historians
led by John Hope Franklin and white “revisionist” historians such as Bell I. Wiley and C.
Vann Woodward, started to reverse this situation.4
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James B. Myers, the Manassas superintendent until 1955, realized that an increase
in visitation between 1948 and 1952 required changes in the park. The 1950s saw a
number of proposals for and the realization of land expansion at Manassas. In 1950, the
NPS possessed 1,670 acres within Manassas’ boundaries. These, however, were
disconnected plots of land that left much of the battlefield, especially for Second
Manassas, unprotected. Superintendent Myers hoped to take in lands that would connect
these disjointed pieces of property to provide for greater interpretation of both battles. His
first project was an attempt to purchase grounds surrounding monuments outside the NPS
boundaries. The New York Monuments that were erected in 1906 in honor of the Fifth
and Tenth New York, and the Fourteenth Brooklyn Infantry Regiments, and the
sandstone monument erected in 1865 on the unfinished railroad grade all remained on
private property. By 1950, the four monuments, as well as the Henry Hill sandstone
monument, had fallen into disrepair. Myers hoped to purchase the grounds to protect the
monuments and to restore them.5 This initial step in park expansion suggested a changing
attitude in emphasis at Manassas. First, the hope to include grounds that were part of the
Second Battle of Manassas showed that the NPS wanted to raise awareness of both fights.
The emphasis on First Manassas meant the connection to Stonewall Jackson was central
to Manassas, but the inclusion of Second Manassas would broaden interpretation and
bring the good work of James Longstreet back into the narrative.
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Second, by pushing for the inclusion of Union monuments at Manassas,
Superintendent Myers was starting to break the Lost Cause stranglehold on the site. In
April 1950, the State Legislature of New York agreed to purchase the lands around the
three New York monuments for transfer to the NPS. Two years later, that body purchased
those lands for almost fifty thousand dollars. It then planned to sell the land to the NPS
for the same price. These lands included the area where the Fifth and Tenth New York
made their gallant stand against Longstreet’s assault on 30 August 1862.6 The
Confederate narrative would not be the sole interpretation at Manassas. The state of
Union monuments at Manassas, however, partly shows the grip of Confederate history on
the park. The twin sandstone monuments and the New York monuments had fallen into a
state of disrepair since they were first erected. Any commemoration of the Union forces
lacked high values and standards given to the Confederates after the Sons of Confederate
Veterans (SCV) and United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) had owned the
grounds. But the inclusion of these Union grounds and monuments displayed a new step
toward a balanced interpretation of the battle. It would now elevate awareness of the
Union participation at Manassas.
As early as 1954, Superintendent Myers began approving changes in the
permanent interpretive exhibits, but it would take almost a decade until new exhibits
became a part of the park. The implementation of NPS director Conrad L. Wirth’s
initiative, Mission 66, would play a role in these changes. Mission 66 provided Manassas
with funding that went into improving interpretation and the condition of the Union
monuments in the park. Motivated by increased visitation and the approaching centennial
6

Agreement between Joint Legislative Committee on Historic Sites and the National Park Service,
21 May 1952, D66 MANA Monuments and Markers Folder, box 1262, Entry P-11, General Records, RG
79, NARA II.

79

for Civil War sites, Wirth hoped this program would improve visitors’ experiences with
the Park Service. Although Myers would not remain as the park’s superintendent for the
implementation of Mission 66, his ideas on interpretation became the basis for future
improvements at the site.7
In 1956, as part of Mission 66, the NPS performed a study at Manassas to find
areas for improvement. During this study, the park’s leaders discovered the extent of Lost
Cause mythology that existed in the interpretation at Manassas. The newly appointed
superintendent, Francis F. Wilshin, was a Virginian who received his master’s degree in
history from Columbia University and had previously helped historian Joseph Mills
Hanson develop interpretation at Manassas Battlefield. He immediately went to work
improving historical interpretation. Although Wilshin had a deep interest in the First
Battle of Manassas and leaned toward a Lost Cause interpretation of the conflict (one of
Wilshin’s great-grandfathers served under J. E. B. Stuart), he understood the problems
inherent in the Confederate victories at Manassas.8 The majority of the report drafted by
Wilshin and Manassas park historian Robert G. Sanner emphasized visitor
accommodations. One section in the report, however, noted a “lack of interpretive
balance in the Union and Confederate markers in the Henry Hill area.” Wilshin and
Sanner argued, “[D]eliberate care has to be exercised to ensure a balanced treatment of
the interpretive story.” In addition, both men noted that this was especially true when it
was taken into consideration that “approximately 128 acres” of land had been owned by
7
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the SCV and Manassas Battlefield Confederate Park, Inc. By 1956, the Confederate lines
along Henry Hill had been marked with “attractive metal markers,” but there were none
for the Union line. Also, plaques of different quality marked places where officers were
wounded or killed. On the one hand, for example, the spot where Union colonel Orlando
B. Wilcox was wounded at First Manassas was marked with a “small weathered masonite
marker . . . framed in wood and nailed to a tree.” On the other hand, an “attractive
aluminum marker . . . indicates the spot where fell [Confederate] Brig. Gen. E. KirbySmith.” Correcting this imbalance became a main priority for Wilshin’s and Sanner’s
first projects in the Mission 66 era.9
Some of the findings in the “Study on Visitor Needs and Interpretive Services,”
however, took time to implement. Wilshin understood that the centennial would increase
attendance and that he needed to focus more on infrastructural necessities rather than on
interpretive improvements at that time. Instead of placing new interpretive markers,
Wilshin finalized the purchase of lands important to the two battles outside the park
boundaries, such as the land around the Stone Bridge. The known imbalance in
interpretation at Manassas had to remain in place until after the centennial celebration
while the park prepared for the increased number of visitors.10
The NPS at Manassas suddenly found itself in the middle of national attention as
the centennial approached. As Wilshin took control of Manassas as the superintendent
and looked for ways to improve the park, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the U.S.
9
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Congress approved the creation of the Civil War Centennial Commission (CWCC) in
August 1957. This commission had a mix of members from governmental positions as
well as the public sector. Congress gave the commission the duty of making the
centennial “as meaningful as possible” to all Americans. But a number of issues arose
almost immediately, for the commission was instructed to “cooperate with State, civil,
patriotic, hereditary and historic groups and with institutions of learning” to create a
meaningful commemoration.11
Running parallel to the centennial, the Civil Rights Movement factored into how
the Civil War would be commemorated. Segregationists immediately attempted to
highjack the centennial to fulfill their racist agenda. Black Americans would eventually
use the centennial to create a counter-memory. They received support from a number of
white historians. Caught in the middle, the CWCC would eventually fracture under the
cultural clash as the centennial evolved. Most importantly for Manassas, the centennial
celebration, which featured a full-scale reenactment of the first battle, marked a turning
point for both the park and the CWCC’s commemoration.12
First Manassas Centennial Celebration, 1957-1962
The Civil War Centennial reinvigorated the sectional debate over Civil War
memory, which had receded in the early twentieth century. Through teaching Lost Cause
mythology, Southerners hoped to prevent the powerful Civil Rights Movement from
changing their Jim Crow society. Enthusiasm for the Civil War in the North increased in
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the period of the Centennial, but the region would never equal the South’s enthusiastic
displays of Civil War nostalgia. Also, events in the North did not contain the same level
of politicization as seen in the South. Mainly due to the embrace of reconciliation since
the end of the Civil War, northerners took part in the Centennial through tourism at Civil
War sites.13 Black Americans used the Civil Rights Movement as a tool to produce a
counter-memory during the centennial. By promoting their rights as citizens, they
attempted to battle the domination of Lost Cause memory in the South, as well as at NPS
Civil War sites. The Civil Rights Movement complicated the byproducts of Civil War
memory, for black leaders used the centennial as an opportunity to teach great moments
in the history of African Americans.14
Many white Americans, however, hoped to celebrate the war while ignoring
southern slavery’s role in the cause of the conflict. They anticipated retaining a unified
memory of the war based on the Lost Cause doctrine. CWCC executive director Karl S.
Betts, a Kansas-born businessman, founding member of the Washington, D.C., Civil War
Round Table and the CWCC, and World War I veteran, claimed the commission would
not be “emphasizing Emancipation” during the commemorations. In addition, he stated,
“You see, there’s a bigger theme – the beginning of a new America.” He also promoted
the Lost Cause ideal of the “contented slave” in his statements. He asserted, “A lot of
colored people ‘loved life as it was in the old South’ . . . ‘There’s a wonderful story here
– a story of great devotion that is inspiring to all people, white, black or yellow.’” During
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the planning phase, Betts suggested to black organizations that if they planned to
commemorate the centennial, they should “have ‘their own’ celebration[s].”15
The majority of white Americans hoped to follow Betts’s vision. They wanted to
celebrate the war and avoid further conflict by commemorating American unity since that
conflict. Major General Ulysses S. Grant III, chairman of the CWCC and grandson of the
victorious Union general, stated the Commission members hoped to commemorate and
celebrate the one-hundredth anniversary of the conflict to “arouse national pride rather
than stir regional animosities.” In addition, he found it disturbing that “people think of the
centennial as only a giant refighting of the war.” He noted, however, “This isn’t the case
at all.”16 The Centennial would follow a similar pattern to that of the Reconciliationist
Movement of the 1890s. By overlooking the true causes of the Civil War, the
Commission could commemorate the actions of soldiers from both armies without any
acrimony.
This display of unity would act as, what historian Robert J. Cook termed, a “Cold
War pageant.” Many in the government supported this desire since there would be
demonstrations to further strengthen American unity at the height of the Cold War.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a former resident of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, believed
that twentieth-century Americans could apply lessons from the Civil War to their own
lives. He urged Americans to look on the Civil War “not merely as a set of military
operations, but as a period in our history in which the times called for extraordinary
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degrees of patriotism and heroism on the part of the men and women of both the North
and the South.” To him Americans could derive “inspiration from their deeds,” which
would reinvigorate their “dedication to the task which yet confronts us—the furtherance,
together with other free nations of the world, of the freedom and dignity of man and the
building of a just and lasting peace.”17 State officials also saw the Centennial as a way to
strengthen the bond between Americans by remembering the “noble deeds” of the “brave
men and women on both sides,” instead of the “hate and discord of the Civil War.” Major
General Grant III expressed similar sentiments in the prelude to the centennial. He noted
the members of the CWCC acknowledged the “war was a great tragedy.” The
Commission members also believed, however, that the “war served to draw us closer
together rather than to tear us apart.”18 One group went as far as promoting the
construction of a “Civil War Hall of Fame” that would “truly belong to the American
people . . . to stand as a monument to our national unity.”19 By emphasizing American
unity, the CWCC and other government officials hoped Centennial events would help in
the battle against Communism.
The NPS followed a similar line of reasoning when planning for the Centennial
events in the late 1950s. Manassas was slated as the first major event reenacting one of
17
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the key battles in the American Civil War. The germination of the project came during a
meeting between members of the NPS, the CWCC, and the Manassas Chamber of
Commerce in September 1958. The groups involved with the initial planning phases
made it clear from the start that they desired a reenactment promoting the bravery of the
common soldiers and ignoring the larger, controversial context of this first battle. They
hoped to raise about one hundred thousand dollars to hold the event in the park and
proposed an event that would bring one hundred men from each state that participated in
the first battle—2,300 in all—to Manassas to reenact the fighting. They also anticipated
one hundred thousand visitors to witness the event.20
The federal government was hesitant to commit to the event. It cited previous
reenactments that had a number of problems and the NPS monetary policy stating that the
service did not finance such plans. Wilshin, however, put his support behind the proposed
reenactment, noting that a “reenactment could be held [at Manassas] employing about
2,300 men without any material damage whatever to the park.” Elbert Cox, the NPS
regional director of Region One, held similar concerns, but stated he would support the
event “provided there be consistent understanding that the activities are to be guided by
the technical and historical advice of our people and that no National Park Service funds
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whatever will be available for either direct or incidental costs” from the reenactment.21
By February 1959, NPS director E. T. Scoyen approved the proposal; provided that the
outside groups created a sound plan for the event and that the NPS avoided using any of
the agency’s funds for staging the reenactment. Three months later, after the Virginia
Civil War Centennial Commission agreed to take an active role in the planning and
funding of the event, the federal CWCC officially announced approval of the First
Manassas reenactment for July 1961.22
In addition to the Cold War pageantry that many American leaders imagined,
officials at Manassas, especially Superintendent Wilshin, saw a grand opportunity to
develop a strong interpretive tool in the reenactment’s aftermath. While planning for the
reenactment, Wilshin pushed for the professional videotaping of the event for use in the
visitor center in subsequent years. Wilshin believed, “Filmed in color and stereophonic
sound the event will provide a medium of unparalleled value in Museum battle
interpretation.” Others in the NPS thought the film would “allow [for] a fine interpretive
program, since a motion picture can provide more interest and drama than a slide
program.”23 The NPS had greater plans for the Centennial outside of further solidifying
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American unity. It remained to be seen, however, how effective of an interpretive tool
this event could become.
While the majority of white Americans, especially the CWCC members, tended to
ignore the racial issues of the Civil War to emphasize national unity, many white
Southerners saw the upcoming Centennial as a way to defend segregationist policies.
Segregationists felt a strong connection between the federal government’s attempts to
desegregate the region and the Lost Cause their ancestors had fought for one hundred
years prior. They used Civil War memory as a way to perpetuate segregation of the
region, highlighting the Lost Cause mythology of the Old South as a place of racial
harmony populated by happy, contented black slaves.24 Consequently, racism became a
central part of the debate over Civil War memory during the Centennial
commemorations.
During the planning for the Manassas reenactment, it remained clear that the
focus would be on American unity at the expense of the Civil War’s causes. In the year
after the formal acceptance of the proposed reenactment, the NPS set about revising
exhibits in the Visitor Center’s museum in preparation for the Centennial. From the
outset, the exhibit authors sought to sidestep the sensitive issue of slavery’s cause of the
Civil War. For example, the connection between slavery and the start of the Civil War in
the first battle and the association between the Emancipation Proclamation and the Union
defeat in the second battle remained conspicuously absent in a panel meant to “state the
significance of the battles fought here.” In another panel discussing the “South Vs. North,
1860-1861,” which compared “the resources of the two sections on the eve of the Civil
War,” one of the South’s greatest resources, slaves, remained conspicuously absent. In
24
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addition, the authors of the exhibit followed the Lost Cause argument that emphasized the
superior industry of the Northern states in its victory over the South. Slavery was
mentioned in only one panel. Although the proposed exhibits in 1960 were never
installed, the planning outline shows the mindset of the NPS leaders at Manassas. Led by
Wilshin, the Manassas historians leaned toward a Lost Cause emphasis in their
interpretation, which would filter into their work during the Centennial.25
Similarly, the Manassas Chamber of Commerce, which had a hand in the
Committee for First Manassas organization and later the First Manassas Corporation, and
the CWCC hoped to create an event that would avoid the Civil War’s racial issues and
continue the central theme of Cold War pageantry. The majority of groups involved in
planning the reenactment desired a shining example of American unity to kick off the
centennial. “It should be our aim,” wrote Committee for First Manassas member Wilbur
W. Nusbaum, “to present First Manassas authentically or not at all.”26 In their event
prospectus, the Committee for First Manassas ignored any and all racial issues that could
possibly overshadow the centennial commemoration. The CWCC also became deeply
involved in the event. Grant III and Betts wrote that the Commission was
“wholeheartedly behind you [the Committee for First Manassas] in your plans to reenact
the first battle of Manassas.” In addition, they believed, “This first major land battle of
the war must be restaged – and restaged successfully and impressively – to set the pattern
for the four years of commemorative programs which will follow.”27 Overall the planners
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for the reenactment hoped that “the event can be staged with such colorful and dramatic
realism as to provide an arresting stimulus to a better evaluation and appreciation of the
principles of freedom and democracy on which this Nation was founded – principles
which today hold the hope of the Free World.”28
President Eisenhower promoted a similar idea. He believed the Manassas
reenactment would remind Americans that the “bonds which now unite us are as precious
as the blood of young men. Such bonds are a continuing cause for gratitude, a continuing
source of strength.”29 These groups hoped the First Manassas reenactment would set the
standard for the Cold War pageantry so that other events could promote American unity
and avoid emerging racial issues.
Although the Centennial Commission, the Manassas Chamber of Commerce, and
the NPS envisioned a pageantry of American unity, many Americans exposed the
contradictions that haunted the proposed celebration of the Civil War. For some, the
contradiction was found in the conflict over racism in the United States and its
connection to the Old South. Reverend John Papandrew, a white Unitarian minister from
New Hampshire, compared the segregation of the twentieth century with the Old South’s
institution of slavery. He believed segregation was the “‘new slavery’ in contrast to the
‘old slavery’ practiced before the Civil War. . . . The fight for slavery did not begin in
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1861 and it did not end in 1865.” He declared, “[The] centennial is absurd—it merely recreates the greatest period of schizophrenia this country ever had.”30
During the fourth national assembly of the CWCC in Charleston, South Carolina,
in early 1961, this contradiction became apparent to the public. Due to the segregationist
policies of South Carolina, one member of the New Jersey Committee, Madeline A.
Williams, a black woman, was denied accommodations at the hotel where the committee
was staying. As a result, New Jersey senator Clifford P. Chase decided to boycott the
meeting unless it was moved to a desegregated area. Both New York and Illinois joined
the New Jersey boycott.31 The firestorm created a platform for criticism of the historical
amnesia of the Civil War centennial. One reporter found it ironic that the racial issue,
“which was one of the sparks that set off the Civil War[,] comes up again 100 years later
as one of the issues of controversy at a celebration of the start of the war.” Even Senator
Chase believed that subjecting “Negro members of the commission to segregation would
be irony of a most sort” since the war was “fought to defend freedom and dignity of the
individual.”32 For another author, the fact that Major General Grant III was “reportedly
going on ahead with the Charleston setting” despite South Carolina’s segregation was the
epitome of incongruity for this event since his grandfather had “contributed in a large
measure in the making of black men free.”33 Although the boycott ended once the
meeting had been moved to a desegregated U.S. naval base near Charleston, the damage
30
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had been done. Eventually, the CWCC would implement massive changes partly as a
result of the troubles in Charleston. But Betts’s and Grant’s vision for a Cold War
pageant remained in place through the Manassas reenactment. Still the Charleston crisis
showed the CWCC and other agencies, including the NPS, had to recognize the
connection between the racial issues of the time and Civil War memory.34
For others, the recreation of battles showed another contradiction, especially when
discussing First Manassas. They believed the reenactment did not fully honor the
sacrifice of the soldiers. As one newspaper reporter noted, the reenactment could recreate
much of the action, but one important aspect would be missing, “the heroic illusions with
which it was begun and the cold realism which was its aftermath.”35 A concerned citizen,
Mr. L. O. Stryker, believed that the reenactment of the first battle would be premature,
arguing that the first battle had not covered “either the North or South with any glory.”
He suggested that the commission should reenact a later battle—“one of the good battles
of the Civil War.”36 Another unknown author expressed similar sentiments, stating that
many people understood the desire to commemorate the events of 1861 but that they had
“reservations on re-enactment of the tragic happenings at Bull Run—or for that matter,
any other battle where starry eyed young Americans were killing each other for things
they hardly understood.” The author also believed, “[T]o restage the bloody muddle of
Bull Run as a tourist attraction is to miscalculate Americans’ veneration of those who
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gave their lives on that battlefield.”37 Even as the majority of Americans geared up for the
centennial commemorations, others continued to hammer away at the contradictory
nature of the Centennial Commission’s actions and decisions.
Others questioned whether the Centennial simply perpetuated Lost Cause
mythology and what influence that would have over the four years of commemoration.
Frank Sullivan, a writer from Saratoga, New York, took a satirical approach to the
coming anniversary in 1960. “If every citizen puts his shoulder to the wheel in the four
years and celebrates for all he is worth,” Sullivan wrote, “the forthcoming Civil War
revival may turn [Confederate] defeat into victory.” The Centennial Commission would
take the necessary steps to prevent this reversal, but Sullivan inquired: “But suppose the
boys get carried away by their parts . . . Suppose the Confederate boys re-enacting
Atlanta decide they would like to win this time, for a change. You might have an ugly
situation on your hands. . . . there would always be the risk that some unreconstructed
‘method’ actor from Alabama might stash live cartridges on his person—and bang! the
masquerade would take a sinister turn.”38 Sullivan pointed out the problem with Civil
War memory and interpretation to that time: the South had been winning the fight over
historical memory.
Others expressed similar but more serious concerns about the Centennial. L. O.
Stryker believed that the “South is in the majority in placing this event,” which would
emphasize Southern glory. He suggested, however, if the commission should reenact a
later battle, honor and credit would be given to “both North and South for the type of men
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who fought all battles of the Civil War.”39 Lawrence D. Reddick, a college professor who
specialized in African American history and the author of the Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
biography Crusader without Violence, believed the Centennial events only accomplished
the perpetuation of the “‘Confederacy myth’ and set up harmful emotional barriers.” In
an acceptance speech for the “Union’s Silver Jubilee Award,” Reddick “urged that the
truth be told about the Civil War and that ‘we expose the Confederate myth for the
unhistorical romance much of it is.’” In addition, he recognized the “Confederacy myth”
was “part of the psychological and political resistance to the program of social welfare
legislation” during Reconstruction.40 Clearly, some feared the centennial celebration
would only emphasize the Lost Cause narrative and overlook the Emancipationist and
Unionist narratives in the hoopla.
Some concerns over the Lost Cause myth had already appeared before the
Centennial even started. As seen earlier, the NPS embraced a number of aspects of the
Lost Cause simply through its interpretation at Manassas. The CWCC and other groups
outside the NPS also supported this Lost Cause interpretation through their promotion of
reconciliation while overlooking the racial issues that existed in the nineteenth century
and that arose during the Centennial itself, such as the crisis in Charleston.41 Confederate
heritage groups continued to promote a Lost Cause tore in the upcoming Centennial
events. During the UDC’s annual commemoration of the first battle, their keynote
speaker, retired rear admiral Beverly M. Coleman, whose grandfather was John S.
39
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Mosby, spoke on why soldiers fought in the conflict. In his speech, Coleman argued that
Northerners fought for their country while the Confederates fought for their “state” with
“equal belief in the justice of [their] cause.” For Southerners, however, he believed there
were “two things that particularly aroused the ire of the people of the South: the
overbearing attitude of many too-zealous crusaders and the falsely pious air of a number
of the hypocrites in the North.”42 Similar to the arguments presented by prominent
Confederate veterans during Reconstruction, Coleman blamed the war on Northerners
who pushed the Southerners into secession. Unlike the debate of the 1870s and 1880s,
however, Northerners and Southerners in the 1960s accepted this line of reasoning with
little argument. L. O. Stryker claimed that the soldiers of both armies fought because they
“thought their cause was the right one.”43 It initially seemed that the NPS and the other
groups involved in the Centennial would follow Lost Cause mythology during the
commemorations.
Through all the controversy and debates prior to the reenactment, the Centennial’s
popularity remained high, especially with white southerners. After the Charleston crisis,
the spotlight was on Manassas, as the first major event in the summer of 1961. Although
the NPS agreed to allow the event to take place on the park grounds and assisted in the
planning, the First Manassas Corporation was the main organization placed in charge of
raising funds and providing services for what it called a “historical pageant” of First
Manassas for “the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States.”44 After over
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a year of discussion, the logistics were set for the reenactment. On 22 and 23 July 1961,
over two thousand men would represent the almost thirty thousand who fought in 1861.
Major General James C. Fry, a retired World War II army officer and executive director
of the First Manassas Corporation, directed the event, and Virgil “Pat” Carrington Jones,
the author of numerous books on the Civil War and CWCC liaison officer, acted as the
narrator for the fighting.45
The popularity of the event was apparent even before the main event that
weekend. On 21 July, the First Manassas Corporation ran a dress rehearsal of the
reenactment in front of twenty thousand people. Over the following two days,
approximately one hundred thousand total spectators arrived at Manassas to witness the
recreation of the war’s first major battle.46 As part of the spectacle, the First Manassas
Corporation set up concessions where the spectators could purchase a commemorative
program for twenty-five cents. This program explained part of the motivation for the
reenactment as well as the reason men fought in the war. Following the pattern of
American unity and reconciliation, the program stated, “Today’s commemorative
spectacle has the objective of reminding you of our common heritage—and indeed of
reminding the world—that our people have always been willing to fight and to die if need
be for their beliefs—and their principles.” According to the program, the troops in 1861,
“Whether they wore the blue or the gray . . . were all deeply in love with their country.
And the country they loved was America, though they saw America in segments then.” In
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addition, from the “misery of their differences came the magic and miracle of Union,
Union cemented and accepted and cherished. When the smoke cleared away and the
passions withered in the heat of war the America they all loved spread out before them,
and before us, their children, as one wide, majestic land of infinite opportunity for all.”47
Starting at one p.m., the commemoration began with the arrival of Virginia
governor Lindsay Almond and other special guests. This was followed by the playing of
the national anthem and a prologue delivered by a U.S. Army captain also emphasizing
Cold War unity. The captain noted the spectators had “within the deepest sense of
sentiment traveled back in time 100 years to a place where the long shadows of duty and
patriotism reach out into our very lives today.” A “parade of units” and a “Pageant of
American Unity” ended the displays prior to the reenactment.48
After these festivities, for two and a half hours, the approximately two thousand
reenactors played out the maneuvers and fighting that took place in July 1861. The
spectators watched as reenactors fired reproduction muskets at each other with some
feigning death or wounding. Some of the reenactors were so enthusiastic about their
participation that a number of them jumped back to their feet after acting shot and
rejoined the fight. The spectators were also treated to pre-recorded “Rebel yells” over
loudspeakers near the stands along the hill. Jones narrated the events through these same
loudspeakers. Focusing on the Cold War emphasis for the centennial, the narration
emphasized the glorification of the conflict. When placing the battle in the context of
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U.S. history during the narration, the story started with the bombardment of Fort Sumter
and ignored the reasons for Southern secession. The centerpiece of the production was
the mock artillery duel that took place along the top of Henry Hill. Just as it happened
during the battle in 1861, after the two and a half hours of mock fighting, the Union men
abandoned their guns on Henry Hill to the cheers of the mainly Southern audience.49
Many people in attendance and others who read of the event were impressed with
the spectacle. One spectator, Millard E. Crane from Fonda, New York, wrote his local
newspaper: “We have never witnessed anything like it. It had been so well rehearsed . . .
that one had a distinct sense of immediacy. The pop-pop of musketry; the booming of
cannon belching fire and smoke; the sound of a bugle faintly heard in a lull in the sound
and fury; the falling bodies; the flags unfurled in the breeze; all seemed to catch one up
into a sense of living history and one could almost feel it was 1861.” He continued: “Our
forebears were dedicated men with a cause, no matter which color uniform they wore.”
According to Crane’s observances, the reenactment successfully supported the Cold War
pageantry the CWCC hoped to present. As his family drove home from Manassas
through Washington, D.C., he realized what he learned from the reenactment: “The great
Union was preserved and reunited by stronger bonds than ever. We have suffered
together through four great wars and today present a united front to the foes of our way of
life. With God’s help, let’s be about it.”50 Chairman Steven R. Saunders of the Long
Island Civil War Centennial Association believed that the First Manassas reenactment, as
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well as the reenactments of the firing on Fort Sumter and Lincoln’s First Inauguration,
were “most typical of how the observance should be effected. All of these very fine, very
high-plane events were planned and executed in the spirit of unity and cooperation, the
lack of which is a loss of purpose in the centenary anniversary.”51 From the perspective
of Crane and Saunders, the reenactment was a stirring success of Cold War unity, exactly
as the CWCC had planned.
Americans North and South had already exposed the contradictions that
accompanied the centennial prior to the Manassas reenactment. Similar to these early
critics, the reenactment came under fire in the days afterward. As Cook notes, many
northerners were “frustrated by the damaging impact of segregationist violence on
internal peace and the country’s image abroad,” and, they excoriated “white southerners
for their apparent preference for silly games over racial equality.” Shortly after the
reenactment, an editorialist found in the Jamestown Sun impugned the reenactment a
“ludicrous restaging” in which southerners tried to “obscure their proslavery cause ‘with
pageantry and chivalric legend.’”52 Others expressed similar sentiments. An editorial
published the day of the reenactment suggested, “[T]he issues [the Civil War] was fought
for are still scars across our body as a nation.”53 One northerner, Richard O. Hathaway
from Brunswick, Maine, articulated his displeasure at the reenactment in a letter to the
New York Times: the reenactment of First Manassas “underlines most clearly the
misplaced sense of enthusiasm that has too often pervaded these occasions.” In addition,
he emphasized that his “chagrin at such spectacles” resided in his belief that “such week51

Steven R. Saunders, “A New Years Wish,” December 1961, A20 Civil War Centennial
Commission From 1-1-62 to Dec. 31, 1965 Folder (hereafter A20 CWCC Folder), box 18, Entry P-11,
General Records, RG 79, NARA II.
52
Cook, Troubled Commemoration, 130; and Jamestown Sun, 29 July 1961, quoted in Ibid.
53
New York Herald-Tribune, 22 July 1961 quoted in Cook, Troubled Commemoration, 130.

99

end rehearsals of violence cause Americans to overlook those grievous imbalances and
necessities” that, “one hundred years ago, made the outbreak of violence a tragic but
necessary preliminary to the arduous reconstitution of our society.” He believed that
“rather than engage in such pathetic displays as the re-enactment of battles,” the nation
may gain a far greater profit by devoting “our attentions to the more painful and yet more
rewarding task of exploring those elements and tendencies in our society which allowed
the national calamity of the Civil War to break forth in the first place.” Finally, Hathaway
argued that the spectacles like First Manassas constituted a “grotesque evasion of the
more challenging task before us at this juncture in history, when we can no longer refuse
to be fully human and truly humane.”54
These sentiments were not confined to the North. Some Southern newspapers also
criticized the event. Only two days after the reenactment, an editor for the Richmond
News Leader answered an inquiry as to why there was not greater promotion of the
reenactment. The author wrote, “These sham battles threaten to make a farce of the
greatest tragedy of American history.” In addition, the editor believed, “The gaudy show
at Bull Run was a noisy piece of amateur theatrics, carried on by overgrown boys who
get a thrill out of hearing guns go off,” and the author hoped that “someone in authority”
would “announce that the re-enactment of First Manassas would be the last such charivari
to be staged.”55 Despite the apparent success of the event, by the end of the year many
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historians believed the centennial was, in the words of historian Paul Angle, “an
irresponsible and commercialized flop.”56
The embarrassment that came along with these criticisms led to a number of
changes for the final centennial years in both the CWCC and the NPS. Both Betts and
Grant III considered the event a major success and believed reactions such as the ones
given by Crane and Saunders justified it. The negative responses in the days after the
reenactment, however, created greater pressure from professional historians, including
the prominent Civil War historian Bell I. Wiley, for change. This resulted in Betts’s
dismissal in August 1961 both due to his support of the reenactment and the crisis that
unfolded in Charleston earlier that year. With Betts’s removal, Grant resigned his
position as chairman of the CWCC. The departure of both men outraged a number of
white southerners and consensus historians who saw their ouster as an attack on their
patriotic and Lost Cause rhetoric. To replace Grant, President Kennedy appointed the
distinguished American historian Allan Nevins, who immediately selected James I.
(“Bud”) Robertson for Betts’s former position. This move brought greater legitimacy to
the CWCC, for Nevins hoped to bring “attention to [the war’s] darker aspects” and to
provide a “more critical examination of the romantic brothers’ war trope.”57 Once Nevins
and Robertson took control, the CWCC attempted to reform their approach to the
centennial by presenting an accurate interpretation of the war rather than
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commercializing the centennial events and overlooking the ugly reality of why the war
was fought.58
The NPS reacted in a similar fashion. Although the majority of NPS employees in
attendance believed the reenactment was a “stirring spectacle” that allowed the spectators
to gain a “clearer understanding of Civil War battles in general and the Battle of First
Manassas in particular,” the agency changed its policies in the aftermath.59 NPS director
Conrad L. Wirth refused to authorize any further reenactments on Park Service property
citing the cost and dangers of reenactments both to participants and park property. Wirth,
however, continued to support the commemoration of the Civil War at NPS sites. “In lieu
of re-enactments,” Wirth suggested holding “reasonable and acceptable substitutes.” He
continued, “People generally want and expect some sort of pageantry, and we feel that
such a presentation can be made impressive, interesting, and educationally valuable.”60
Despite the apparent success of the first reenactment, a number of problems caused the
NPS to refuse additional events in the future. The damage to the land was one of the
major factors for this policy change. The negative responses to the reenactments,
however, likely influenced this decision as well. Since the NPS changed course in the
month after the reenactment, the agency’s timing was likely a reaction to the
condemnation of the reenactment in some quarters. Nevertheless, the First Manassas
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reenactment became a turning point in the centennial years as professional historians took
control of the CWCC and the NPS reversed its policies on commemorative events.
Manassas in the Aftermath of the Centennial, 1962-1970
After the First Manassas reenactment, U.S. citizens became less enthralled with
the war’s centennial. Fewer commercial events took place, making it less publicized
between 1962 and 1965. The most telling reason behind this change was the success of
the Civil Rights Movement. In addition to the appointment of Nevins and Robertson to
the CWCC, the traditional Civil War narrative guided by the Lost Cause doctrine started
to lose ground as African Americans became more involved in national politics, and
many historians began emphasizing the agency of African Americans in their studies. As
a result of seminal works in the 1950s, a number of young historians, such as Leon F.
Litwack, James M. McPherson, Eric Foner, Ira Berlin, John W. Blassingame, and Eugene
D. Genovese, who emerged out of the centennial years helped revise the common Civil
War narrative through inclusion of African Americans in the story.61 These changes
would have a major impact on how interpretation developed between the First Manassas
reenactment and the 1970s.
While changes were being made in the CWCC’s work, which included a greater
presence of African Americans in both Centennial Commissions and in the CWCC’s
interpretation, Manassas’s visitation remained on par with those seen in 1961. The only
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major change was that July saw a massive decline mainly due to the difference in crowd
size for the centennial reenactment. Despite the drop in visitation in 1962, the park still
held a UDC commemoration of the first battle that July and planned a commemoration
for the second battle that August.62 Although opposition to the new leadership in the
CWCC delayed the implementation of Nevins’s and Robertson’s new vision, Manassas
and the rest of the NPS worked closely with the CWCC for the rest of the centennial.63
Just as it had been throughout Manassas’s history, the commemoration of Second
Manassas received little attention in the year after the First Manassas reenactment. The
second battle’s commemoration fell in line with the revised policy of the NPS. Instead of
the large-scale commercialized event that occurred the summer before, the Second
Manassas commemoration consisted of a small one-day event. As part of the
commemoration, the Wisconsin Civil War Centennial Commission donated two sixpound bronze cannons, two gun carriages, and a limber in honor of the Iron Brigade. In
addition, the Marine Corps Band and Color Guard from Quantico, Virginia, participated.
The local National Guard fired a salute, and a gun crew from the North-South Skirmish
Association, the organization that had provided the majority of reenactors in the First
Manassas reenactment, fired one of the guns.64 The smaller NPS ceremony showed the
effect of changing attitudes toward the centennial. With less commercialization, the
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centennial became about honoring the troops through ceremonies more appropriate and
solemn than the one seen in July 1961. Additionally, the lack of awareness for Second
Manassas demonstrated another issue in terms of the two battles’ memory. Throughout
the development of Manassas National Battlefield, the involved organizations had
overlooked the second battle. Instead, all concentration had been placed on preserving
and remembering the first battle. The strong connection between Second Manassas and
the Battle of Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation—Second Manassas’s entire
importance in the Civil War narrative—had fallen to the wayside since the turn of the
twentieth century.
Throughout the final three years of the centennial commemoration, the war’s
interpretation underwent additional change under the pressure of the Civil Rights
Movement, and the NPS interpretation followed suit. The presence of African American
historians in northern state centennial commissions provided extra fuel for the presence
of a black counter-memory in the Civil War Centennial.65 With the changes in the CWCC
and the more prominent role of African Americans in the centennial, as well as the
strength of the Civil Rights Movement, Manassas Battlefield also implemented narrative
changes that would follow this pattern. Interpretive exhibits within the park had changed
little since the original permanent signs placed in the park in 1948. The reenactment
prevented Superintendent Wilshin from implementing the changes he planned in 1960.
After the centennial celebrations, however, NPS officials at Manassas attempted to
execute alterations to keep up with new interpretation.66
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By the waning years of the centennial, visitors to Manassas pointed out the
outdated interpretation and pushed for new exhibits. In a letter to Secretary of the Interior
Stewart Udall, tourist William Hauser called the exhibits “one of the ‘shoddiest
collections of mementos’ he had ever seen.”67 Although Wilshin had initiated interpretive
revisions, his insistence on taking on the role of park historian as well as superintendent
delayed the installation of new interpretive exhibits. Wilshin’s Southern heritage and his
obsession with the first battle played a role in his focusing the narrative mainly on the
first battle. Although he showed his desire for new exhibits in the park’s master plan in
1965, Wilshin’s battle with continually changing park historians prevented further
progress.68
The struggles over new interpretation were not the only hurdle for Manassas
Battlefield in the post-reenactment years. Throughout the rest of the decade, Manassas
continued to deal with Lost Cause advocates. As they had traditionally done since the
1920s, the UDC held annual commemorations for the first battle that emphasized the Lost
Cause and mainly memorialized Stonewall Jackson.69 Other groups bent on fighting
against the Civil Rights Movement also attempted to use the Confederate victories at
Manassas to push their agenda. In 1964, George Lincoln Rockwell, the founder of the
American Nazi Party, requested the right to hold a rally at Manassas for “dissident groups
composed of the Ku-Klux Klan, States Righters, White Supremacists and others” over
that Fourth of July. Wilshin cited a lack of facilities and expected fire hazards that would
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come with the anticipated three thousand spectators to push Rockwell toward a different
location near Washington, D.C. Rockwell eventually secured an area near the
Washington Monument for his rally, which meant the NPS did not have to deal with
these groups. But Wilshin noted either way he was prepared to refuse “him the permit”
for such a rally at Manassas.70 Despite the NPS’s willingness to follow new paths of
interpretation in the wake of the centennial, old themes of Civil War memory played a
role in the park’s development into the 1970s. Heritage groups, such as the UDC, and
white supremacist organizations attempted to use the Confederate victories at Manassas
to push their agendas.
The work of the NPS at Manassas continued to reverse this trend by
implementing new lines of interpretation in the decades after the turbulent centennial
years. By 1968, the NPS exhibit planning team completed a new design for the Visitor
Center that started to follow the interpretive trend of Civil War academics. As expected
for Civil War battle sites, the exhibits still centered on the tactical and strategic
importance of First Manassas and the roles of politicians and generals. Instead of
centering solely on these two aspects, however, the planning team also focused on the
experiences of the common soldiers of both armies as well as civilian experiences during
and after the battles. As usual, the exhibits overlooked the connection between slavery
and the Civil War, but the inclusion of common soldiers and civilians showed the NPS’s
willingness to embrace new lines of interpretation especially in social history. Despite
these efforts by the exhibit planning team, Second Manassas was still mainly left out of
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the narrative.71 Although the NPS had done work that went against the established
narrative, the connection to the Lost Cause remained in the park’s interpretation.
Despite the prevailing omission of the contextual importance of the battles of
Manassas to slavery and the Civil War, the development of new interpretation that
emerged in the aftermath of the centennial was a sign of changes to come. More
historians, both black and white, were producing works that attacked the Lost Cause
narrative. Following in the footsteps of “liberal white historians,” such as C. Vann
Woodward and Bell I. Wiley, new names in Civil War studies, such as Woodward
student James McPherson and Wiley student “Bud” Robertson, advanced their mentors’
work. As the 1960s came to a close, the leaders of Manassas Battlefield started to realize
they could not overcome these new lines of interpretation coming out of universities. The
centennial was an important point in Civil War memory throughout the nation. For
Manassas, the centennial marked the point of no return where interpretation became more
than just stories of tactics, politicians, and generals.
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Conclusions
Memory and Development at Manassas since 1970
“[The Disney Corporation] want[s] to move in and destroy real history in order to
create a facsimile, something synthetic, plastic.”
- Historian David McCullough, Congressional Testimony on Disney’s America,
19941
In 1993, the Walt Disney Corporation unveiled plans to construct a third theme
park in the United States. Hoping to prevent economic competition between either
Disney Land or Disney World and this new park, the Disney Corporation looked for
locations outside California and Florida. Recognizing the Washington, D.C., area’s
popularity as a tourist destination, Disney intended to find a site near the nation’s capital.
Since Disney’s new project—Disney’s America—was planned as an history-themed
park, one Disney chairman Michael Eisner hoped would “bring our American experience
to life,” the project looked perfect for this historic region. Maryland’s history of
opposition to new business opportunities near the Washington, D.C., area, however,
forced Disney to scour Virginia for a location. After less than a year of searching, it
found a perfect site. Haymarket, Virginia, provided 3,006 acres for purchase, easy access
to Interstate 66, and proximity to the nation’s capital—thirty-five miles away. Initially,
many people in Prince William County supported this new venture, hoping it would bring
increased revenue and employment. Opposition, however, grew throughout 1993 and into
1994 as Disney got closer to finalizing its plans. This opposition came from numerous
sources, including local citizens, environmentalists, and prominent historians, such as
David McCullough and James McPherson. The reason for the historians’ protests: this
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proposed park would sit on land only four miles from the western boundary of Manassas
National Battlefield Park.2
Historians had numerous concerns about the park’s location. Although the
members of the newly formed Protect Historic America organization—which included
some of the biggest names in the historical field such as C. Vann Woodward, John Hope
Franklin, Doris Kearns Goodwin, Barbara J. Fields, Shelby Foote, McCullough, and
McPherson—believed they had no right to question how Disney would present history,
they thought the placement of a park near so many important historic sites would ruin the
historical value of the Virginia Piedmont. McCullough believed the project was ironic
since Disney intended to “destroy real history” in the “name of history.” He also argued
that although Michael Eisner claimed the citizens of Prince William County “should be
so lucky as to have Orlando come to Virginia,” this in fact would “be a national
tragedy.”3 McPherson likewise stated that if Disney’s America went ahead in Haymarket,
a number of threatened battlefields, including Manassas, “would be doomed to
extinction.”4 Eventually, the questions over the appropriateness of the location as well as
fears of the “Disneyfication” of history, caused the Disney corporation to cancel its plans
in Haymarket and look for a different site to construct the theme park. The Disney
Corporation would ultimately abandon the project.5 This debate over the presence of a
historically themed park near such important historical sites and the resulting reversal of
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Disney’s initial plans provides insight into the modern-day struggles with Civil War
memory.
How Americans remember the Civil War depends upon a number of intertwined
factors. Ancestry plays a major role. Popular culture may be the most important factor as
movies present different visions of what happened during the conflict. NPS sites are a
similarly, perhaps more, significant source of Civil War memory. Hundreds of thousands
of Americans visit Civil War sites protected by the NPS every year. By examining the
history of Manassas National Battlefield, one gains a better understanding of how
divisive Civil War memory has been and continues to be in the United States. This
complex relationship between public memory and the NPS’s role in its creation and
promotion comes to the fore throughout Manassas’s history. As collective memory has
undergone transformations since the end of the war, interpretation at Manassas has
followed similar patterns. Yet, even to this day, the Lost Cause legacy of Manassas and
interpretation at the park remains in constant conflict with the NPS attempts to present a
balanced narrative of the war.
After the 1960s, Manassas followed the trends in the new social history. In the
late 1970s and into the 1980s, historians at the park prosecuted the battle against the Lost
Cause legacy that started during the Centennial, but were faced with a new struggle about
preservation issues. Similar to the initial movements by Civil War veterans, since the
1970s preservation has once again become part of Civil War memory in the NPS,
especially at Manassas. Twenty years prior to Disney’s plan for Haymarket, the Marriott
Corporation, with support from the Prince William County Board of Supervisors,
proposed a complex that included a theme park in a location even closer to the park than
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Haymarket. Most importantly to preservationists, the new complex included high-rise
buildings that would have been viewable from Henry Hill, similar to the Gettysburg
Tower that created debate in the early 1970s and remained on the Pennsylvania
battlefield until 2000.6 After local and preservationist backlash against the plan and
Congressional intervention, Marriot backed out of its proposal in 1977, ending the threat
to the battlefield. By 1980, the NPS acquired the Brawner Farm, now owning all the land
where fighting had occurred.7
Preservation issues, however, did not end with the purchase of the Brawner Farm.
In 1988 two local corporations, the Hazel/Peterson Companies, attempted to construct a
mall on the area known as Stuart’s Hill—the location of Robert E. Lee’s headquarters
during Second Manassas, only about a mile south of Brawner Farm. In addition, the
location of the mall, according to Park Service officials, would have made it visible to
most sections of the battlefield. They also believed the new mall would cause increased
traffic, leading to the widening of Route 234 and Route 29—the two main roads through
the park. Before locals could rally support against the proposed mall, however, the two
companies broke ground and started construction. After months of debate, Congress
passed bill H.R. 4526, which extended Manassas’s boundaries to include Stuart’s Hill,
finally encompassing the majority of important areas to the two battles.8 Although
destructive to the NPS’s efforts to protect the physical landscape of the battlegrounds,
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these fights over preservation increased public awareness of the threats to battlefield
preservation that came along with suburban growth.
In response to the continued urban sprawl, Congress approved the creation of the
Civil War Sites Advisory Committee (CWSAC) in 1990. This group, consisting of
prominent historians as well as politicians, was formed to report on the status of
interpretation and preservation at Civil War sites. The committee promoted stronger
preservation efforts at both the state and federal level that, they believed, would create
jobs and educational opportunities for young students of the conflict. Unlike many local
politicians around Manassas, the members of the CWSAC saw the benefits of preserving
as much ground as possible for battlefield and military parks. As the committee noted,
only by walking the grounds of a battlefield can a person fully understand what occurred
there. They also believed that without comprehending the military actions that led to
Confederate or Union victories, one cannot entirely recognize the implications individual
battles had on the United States economy, politics, and society during the mid-nineteenth
century. Although some historians argued against battlefield preservation due to the idea
that military interpretations were inherently Lost Cause oriented, many historians outside
the CWSAC agreed with this findings and the promotion of battlefield preservation.9
Battlefield preservation remains a major part of Civil War memory through the NPS. The
reaction of local and historical groups to threats against Manassas shows that Americans
generally follow this tradition started by the Civil War veterans. For many, the possibility
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of keeping battlefields in pristine condition allows the greatest possibility to keep the
war’s memory alive.
While the federal government dealt with issues of preservation in the 1980s and
1990s, historians at Manassas continued efforts to reverse the Lost Cause mythology that
existed in interpretation. NPS chief historian Edwin C. Bearss and Manassas
superintendent Rolland Swain wanted to increase the attention given to Second Manassas
and the contextual importance of the two battles. In 1983, Bearss and Swain approved the
erection of new interpretive signs at Manassas. Many of the wayside and interpretive
exhibits to that point had been erected during the Mission 66 era. Bearss described these
signs as “a hodge-podge of styles and concepts . . . There is considerable duplication in
the texts and some misinformation.”10 Despite the increased NPS awareness to the Lost
Cause presence, interpretation at Manassas stood on the same grounds as it had prior to
the Civil Rights Movement. New historians, such as Bearss and Swain, however, assailed
the Lost Cause by changing interpretation.
Yet the Lost Cause remained even after the alterations approved by Bearss and
Swain. In 1983, in the attempt to update the wayside exhibits for the first battle, the park
prepared to place new audio stations along the Henry Hill walking trail at important
points on the rise. The NPS planned to include the voices of one Confederate and one
Union soldier to present the narrative, but only the final stop, which explained the final
stages of the battle and the Union “skedaddle” back to Washington, D.C., included the
Union perspective. In addition, the Sons of Confederate Veterans had a part in one of the
10
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new interpretive tools, an audio-visual exhibit for the museum. The organization donated
seven thousand dollars for the new program. Following the SCV’s desire for
interpretation laid out in the early twentieth century when the group partly owned the
Manassas battlefields, the NPS designed a display that explained only the military
situation during the First Manassas campaign. This show returned to the idea of
examining solely the military tactics and strategy that were connected to the two battles.11
Despite improvements in interpretation by the 1980s, the Lost Cause persistently
manipulated how the war would be remembered at Manassas.
Increasingly, however, the NPS looked for opportunities to expand the
interpretive context at the park, which also reversed the park’s Lost Cause legacy. The
NPS allowed for a number of archeological digs at Manassas between 1986 and
September 1992. These digs yielded a large cache of artifacts that provided a “whole new
insight into antebellum slave life . . . in Piedmont Northern Virginia.”12 In 1993, as a
result of the archeologists’ work, Manassas’s museum specialist James Burgess decided
to display these objects in the Visitor Center’s museum. Burgess explained that he hoped
the exhibit would echo the “continuity of cultural tradition” in the slave community. He
explained, “Even though slavery was a dehumanizing experience, these people tried to
hold onto their cultural identity somewhat, and I hope the exhibit reflects this.”13 This
shows that the influence of the new social history extended beyond the academy and
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influenced how Manassas historians would incorporate interpretation that included nonmilitary themes.
Manassas followed a larger academic trend against the established interpretation
of the Lost Cause in Civil War history. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s with historians
taking an increased interest in slavery studies, the 1980s saw a steady increase in studies
on the connection between the Civil War and slavery as the 125th anniversary of the war
approached. New social historians, such as Eric Foner and George C. Rable, continued
their work on the legacy of the Civil War and a new group of historians, such as Barbara
J. Fields and David W. Blight, followed in these historians’ footsteps.14 In addition,
McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for history in 1989,
directly connected the institution of slavery and the conflict. His study examined the Civil
War era from the 1830s through the end of the war. Similar to his previous monographs,
McPherson’s book argued the institution of slavery played a prominent role in the cause
of the Civil War.15 The 1980s saw the solidification of the connection between slavery
and the Civil War in interpretation. This academic turn became a part of NPS
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interpretation by this point as well. The NPS at Manassas, however, still struggled with
the park’s legacy as a monument to the Confederacy.
The CWSAC also influenced how interpretation would evolve at NPS sites. In
addition to examining further needs of battlefield preservation, the CWSAC responded to
questions about interpretation. The committee believed that interpretation needed
improvement at many Civil War sites by including issues outside the military actions.
The members noted: “The programs at many . . . battlefields are confined to the military
combat that took place there, or to the military life. Related themes such as the military
and support roles played by African Americans, Native Americans, Hispanics, and
women; unequal pay for African-American soldiers, passage of the 13th Amendment to
the Constitution, cavalry and partisan warfare; and naval activities of the war are seldom
presented except peripherally.” They also argued, “Well-interpreted battlefield parks . . .
do not restrict their interpretation solely to the battle but present an array of themes such
as the impacts of the battle and the War on the community’s social, economic, and
political affairs.”16 These findings had a meaningful impact on interpretation at Manassas
National Battlefield beginning in the early 1990s.
The NPS started addressing these issues brought to light by the CWSAC in the
1990s. But the agency, as NPS chief historian Robert K. Sutton wrote, “has not
sufficiently used its sites to convey the true significance and breadth of America’s Civil
War experience” as the Sesquicentennial approached. Traditionally, battlefield
preservation resulted from a desire for reconciliation between the North and South, which
causes many Americans to “use our battlefields to define the nation’s Civil War
experience in largely military terms—through the eyes of the participants of battle.” The
16

CWSAC, Report, 35, 48, CWSAC Folder, Historian’s Files, MNBPL.

117

main body of interpretation continues to center on the specific military events “with little
discussion of the relationship of those military events to social, economic, and political
evolution of the nation. As a result, large segments of the population fail to see the war’s
relevance.”17 But Sutton made this report so the Civil War sites in the NPS could respond
by reversing these issues for the war’s 150th anniversary.
Since the end of Disney’s bid for a park in Haymarket, however, Manassas’s
historians have taken steps to fulfill Sutton’s call by further interpreting the greater
impact of the two battles and the war. Although larger steps could be taken regarding the
impact African Americans had on the campaigns and battles outside of directly fighting
in them, contextualizing Civil War battles allows the NPS to fight against the Lost Cause
mythology that has prevented balanced interpretation since the end of the conflict.18 The
contextualization of the two Manassas battles provides increased knowledge of the
connection between the military, society, and politics in a time of conflict for the park’s
visitors. This includes two exhibits in the visitor center museum that directly address
slavery’s influence on antebellum politics that caused the Civil War. Park historians are
now required to place the battles into the larger narrative of the conflict in their
interpretive programs. Also, for the 150th anniversary of the first battle, the park created

17

Robert K. Sutton, “Holding the High Ground: Interpreting the Civil War through the Sites of the
National Park System,” Presented at the Conference of Battlefield Managers, Nashville, Tenn., 24–27
August 1998, 1–2.
18
In his study on the role of African Americans during the Peninsula Campaign, Glenn David
Brasher mentions that the NPS lacks a comprehensive overview of how both freed African Americans and
slaves impacted campaigns and battles outside of fighting in the Union army. See, Glenn David Brasher,
The Peninsula Campaign and the Necessity of Emancipation: African Americans and the Fight for
Freedom (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 1–3.
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specialized weekly tours, as well as specifically for the Sesquicentennial weekend, that
examined nonmilitary topics.19
Along the same lines, the NPS published two booklets that address the causes of
the Civil War for the conflict’s Sesquicentennial. One entitled Slavery: Cause and
Catalyst of the Civil War states that although a number of issues “ignited the Civil War . .
. all were inextricably bound to the institution of slavery.” The second, entitled The Civil
War Remembered, includes six articles written by prominent Civil War historians—such
as David W. Blight, Allen C. Guelzo, and Ira Berlin—and directly addressing slavery,
emancipation, or the Civil War’s legacy.20 By presenting the battles and the war in this
way and making these booklets available to the public, the NPS explores more than just
the military results of the two Manassas battles and attempts to create a “relevance” for
all Americans.
Even though the NPS still fights against Lost Cause mythology, Civil War
memory continually evolves across generations, which complicates alterations to
interpretation at these highly public places. As one reporter noted in 1990, “Each
generation views the eternal yet changing history of the conflict between the states
through its own prism.” Noticeably, interest in the Civil War goes through cycles
according to what is happening in the United States. As McPherson notes: “When we’re
[the United States] at war, or just getting over a war, nobody pays attention to the Civil

19
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War. . . . But we get interested again as our irritation about recent wars fades away.”21
Additionally, Americans attempt to connect the Civil War to modern politics as seen
during the Centennial when Segregationists and African Americans used the celebration
to further their causes. Perhaps just as important as generational changes, ancestral ties
prevent fully balanced interpretation. As the SCV’s actions have shown throughout
Manassas’s history, the descendents of Confederates, especially those who are members
of Confederate heritage groups, tend to react negatively to interpretation that implies any
connection between the Confederacy’s motivations for secession and the institution of
slavery.22 Since NPS sites are part of the federal government, the officials that approve
changes in the parks must carefully implement new interpretation that could create
controversy. This makes the process of adjusting analysis at NPS sites occur more slowly
than in the universities. Despite the work of NPS historians, the influence of collective
memory on Civil War history evolves from generation to generation, which makes it
difficult to keep up with the societal implications. In addition, ancestral ties prevent quick
improvements as the agency has to take into consideration how groups may react to new
lines of interpretation.
For Manassas, the legacy of the Lost Cause persistently affects the memory of the
Civil War through historical interpretation there. Throughout the history of Manassas
National Battlefield, the Lost Cause primarily created the battle narratives for
interpretation. The influence of the SCV and UDC still exists as the two groups hold
special presentations near the anniversary of the first battle to honor “Stonewall” Jackson.
21

Leonard Bushkoff, “The Civil War in American Memory,” The Christian Science Monitor, 19
September 1990.
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Also, unlike other battlefield and military parks that contain a National Cemetery
originally designated solely for the Union dead, the presence of Groveton Confederate
Cemetery perpetually stands as a reminder of the park’s Lost Cause legacy and its strong
connection to Confederate heritage groups. Increased interpretation of Second Manassas
and the following of interpretive trends that challenge the Lost Cause, however, have led
to and continue to emphasize a more balanced interpretation of the two battles since the
Civil War Centennial.
Although the Reconcilitionist movement of the 1890s led to reunification by the
early twentieth century, Manassas National Battlefield Park is an example of the
lingering sectionalism in Civil War memory since that era. The establishment of NPS
Civil War sites, especially at Manassas, show that reconciliation did not end the sectional
debates over Civil War memory. As seen through the history of Manassas National
Battlefield, sectionalism remained into the mid-twentieth century and has influenced
interpretation even today. Yet by placing greater emphasis on the relationship between
the military events and its influence on politics, economics, and society in the nineteenth
century, rangers at Manassas National Battlefield Park continue to complicate the Lost
Cause mythology’s presence in interpretation and therefore deconstruct the existing
sectionalism in interpretation. Eventually, as a result of increased inclusion of these
connections and further breaking down of sectionalism in Civil War memory, the Lost
Cause myth might become a cultural artifact instead of providing an analysis of the war
itself at NPS sites.
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